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Comment
THE VALIDITY OF TIME LIMITATIONS IN ACCIDENTAL
MULTIPLE INDEMNITY DEATH PROVISIONS OF
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many accident and life insurance policies provide for the payment of multiple benefits, often double the face amount of the policy,' if the insured dies as the result of an accident. 2 These multiple
benefit provisions are not intended to provide the insured's beneficiary with a windfall, 3 but rather are meant to compensate for the in1. Breenan & Delgado, Death, Multiple Defnitions or a Single Standard?, 54 S. CAL.
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 612, at 128
(1981). "A provision in a life insurance policy, whereby the company agrees to pay
twice the face of the contract in case of accidental death" is referred to as a double
indemnity provision. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 678 (3d ed.
1976). "However, these benefits 'have been variously designated as "double indemnity," "additional indemnity," and "accidental death benefits .......
Strictly speaking, the term "double indemnity" is no longer applicable now that companies . . .
are willing to issue amounts of accidental death benefits which may be a multiple of
the policy's face ....
' " Note, Death Be Not Proud-The DemiSe of Double Indemnity
Tmne Limitations, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 854 n.l (1974) (quoting D. GREGG, LIFE AND

L. REV. 1323 (1981); 1CJ. APPLEMAN,

HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK

269 (2d ed. 1964)).

2. IC J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1. See also Breenan & Delgado, supra note 1, at
1330-31. Typically the policy language provides that the insurer will pay the insured's beneficiary an "accidental death benefit" equal to a multiple of the face
amount of the policy providing that death results from an accidental bodily injury
during a period in which the policy was in force. See, e.g., Kirk v. Financial Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 192, 193, 369 N.E.2d 340, 341 (1977), rev'd, 75 11. 2d 367, 389
N.E.2d 144 (1978). In Kirk, the policy in question contained a multiple benefit indemnity provision which provided in pertinent part: "ACCIDENTAL DEATH
BENEFIT. The company . . .will pay an Accidental Death Benefit . . .upon receipt . . . of due proof . . . which directly shows the accidental death occurred;
(1) death resulted directly and solely from an accidental bodily injury, and (2) death
occurred within ninety (90) days after the bodily injury .... ." Id at 193, 269
N.E.2d at 341. For a discussion of the court's decision in Kirk, see notes 148-70 and
accompanying text infra.

3. Breenan & Delgado, supra note 1, at 1330 (citing R.

KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON

§ 3.1(a), at 88 (1971)). Professor Keeton points out that insurance is
an arrangement to provide for the wide disbursement of accidental losses. One aspect of this arrangement involves "the transfer ofloss from an insured to an insurer by
means of an obligation upon the insurer to confer an offsetting benefit. " R. KEETON,
supra, § 3.1(a), at 88. The notion that insurance involves a "transfer of loss" or the
receipt of an "offsetting benefit" implies that the benefit conferred should not be
greater than the loss suffered. See id This principle, known as the principle of indemnity, serves as the basis for all insurance contracts and helps to protect against
the loss of the insured's property or life. Id § 3.1(b), at 88-90.
INSURANCE LAW
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creased psychological trauma which generally accompanies
accidental death. 4 Although the insurer is obligated to pay'a multiple of the policy's face amount in the event of accidental death, the
insurer generally attempts to limit this potential for increased liability
by including within the policy a time limitation clause, which provides that multiple benefits are payable only if the insured's death
5
occurs within a specified period following the accident.
Traditionally, these time limitation provisions have been upheld
as valid and enforceable limitations on coverage. 6 They have with8
7
stood challenges characterizing them as ambiguous, unreasonable,
unfair to the insured, 9 contrary to main provisions of the policy, 10 and
invalid as against public policy. 11 In recent years, however, three jurisdictions have used various theories to refuse enforcement of these
limitation provisions. 12
4. Breenan & Delgado, supra note 1, at 1330-31.
5. See IC J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 612 at 128; W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 192, at 988-90 (3d ed. 1951). See also Note, Insurance-The
Vahdty of a Tme Limitation in Accidental Death or Disability Provisions of Life Insurance
Pohces, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 597, 600 (1973). For a statement of typical policy
language, see note 2 supra.
Courts generally allow insurers to impose limitations upon their liability so long
as the limitations are not violative of statutory regulations or public policy. See 7 J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE

LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 4255, at 17 (1942).

6. See ICJ. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 612, at 128-29; W. VANCE, supra note 5,
§ 192, at 989; Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 1311, 1315, 1320 (1971). Some decisions have
denied recovery without ever considering the validity of the provisions by simply
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. See, e.g., Orill v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Cal. 1942); Randall v. State
Mutual Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 268, 145 S.E.2d 41 (1965); Thompson v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 179 Iowa 603, 161 N.W. 655 (1917).
7. See Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938);
Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Crome
v. North Am. Accident Ins. Co., 96 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
8. See Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938);
Clarke v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 180 Ill. App. 300 (1913).
9. See Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
10. See Alamo Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cardwell, 67 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934).
11. See Bennett v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794
(1939); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
See generally IC J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 612, at 129; Note, Insurance-Accidental
Death-A Provision Limiting Recovery ofAccidental Death Benefits to an Occurrence of Death
Wthin Ninety Days of the Accident is Contrary to Publc Pohy and Unenforceable, 26 S.C.L.
REV. 147, 149 (1974); Annot. 39 A.L.R. 3d 1311, 1313 (1974).
12. See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App. 326, 174
Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981) (time limitation not invalid as a matter of public policy, but
trial court required to admit evidence on causation under the "process of nature"
rule rather than rely on arbitrary time limitation); Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1976), af, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381
A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977) (time limitation read as requiring only that there be "clear
and convincing evidence" that the accident was the cause of death whenever the time
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It is the purpose of this comment to provide the reader with an
understanding of the various interpretations given time limitation
clauses in accidental, multiple indemnity death provisions as
presented in cases in which death has occurred outside the time period specified by the limitation. This comment will first examine the
view, currently supported by an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, upholding such time limitations as valid and enforceable,
thereby precluding multiple indemnity.1 3 Next, this comment will
analyze the view espoused in Burne v. Frankhn Life Insurance Co., 14 in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held such limitations to be
unenforceable as violative of public policy.1 5 Although no reported
decision has totally adopted the Burne rationale, one jurisdiction has
adopted a limited interpretation of Burne. 16 Another jurisdiction,
while refusing to adopt the public policy rationale of Burne, has used
another theory to defeat time limitation clauses. 7 Finally, this comment will compare these various views and suggest a direction for
future decisions. 1 8
II.

THE MAJORITY VIEW: A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE
LIMITATION ON COVERAGE

Until the past decade, time limitations in accidental death insurance provisions were strictly construed in accordance with principles
of general contract law so as to give full effect to the manifest intentions of the parties.19 This "strict construction" view was first articulimitation is exceeded); Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799
(1973) (time limitation unenforceable as contrary to public policy and not applicable
when no dispute exists as to causation). For a discussion of National Lie, see notes
204-24 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Karl, see notes 178-203 and
accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Bume, see notes 78-115 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 19-77 and accompanying text infra.
14. 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
15. See notes 78-115 and accompanying text infra.
16. See Karl v. New York Life Insurance Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564
(Law Div. 1976), af'd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977). For a
discussion of the court's decision in Karl, see notes 148-70 and accompanying text
infra. For a discussion of the dual interpretations of Burne, see notes 78-115 infra.
17. See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App. 3d 326, 174
Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981). For a discussion of the court's decision in NationalLife, see notes
204-24 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the public policy rationale in
Burne, see notes 86-93 and accompanying text infra.
18. For a discussion of the various views and a suggested direction for future
decisions, see notes 225-51 and accompanying text infra.
19. For a discussion of cases applying strict principles of contract law, see notes
20-77 and accompanying text infia. See, e.g., Randall v. State Mutual Ins. Co., 112
Ga. App. 268, 145 S.E.2d 41 (1965) (strict application of general contract principles
to deny recovery under an accident insurance provision even though insured's death
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lated in Perry v. ProvidentLife Insurance & Investment Co. 20 Perry involved
a claim by a beneficiary for additional death benefits under a policy
with a ninety-day limitation period. 21 When the insurer refused to
pay the accidental death indemnity because death occurred outside
the ninety-day period, the insured's beneficiary brought a breach of
contract action alleging that the time limitation was "inconsistent
with the general object and tenor of the policy and . . .[therefore]
void."'2 2 The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that no such inconsistency was apparent in the policy, which clearly limited the insurer's
liability to cases within the time limitation. 23 The court noted that its
decision was merely the result of the parties' contract terms, which
simply provided for coverage against certain accidents resulting in the
insured's death within the specified time period.2 4 The court pointed
out that, despite the fact that the instant case came very near to being
within the terms of the policy (one day), it was "not quite" within the
terms of the policy and, therefore, coverage had to be denied.2 5 This
strict application of general contract law in interpreting time limitaoccurred approximately 11 hours after the expiration of time limitation); Mullins v.

National Causalty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938) (strict application of
general contract principles to deny recovery under accident insurance provision even
though insured's death occurred about five hours after expiration of 30-day time limitation period); Perry v. Provident Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 99 Mass. 162 (1868) (strict
application of contract principles to deny recovery under accident insurance provision even though death occurred one day after expiration of a 90-day time limitation
period). Generally, insurance policy terms are construed to give full effect to the
intention of parties as set forth in the policy provided that intention is not contrary to
public policy. See 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7381, at i
(1943); W. VANCE, supra note 5, § 136, at 808. Likewise, courts generally allow insurers to impose limitations upon their liability provided the limitations are not violative
of statutory regulations or public policy. 7 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 5, § 4255, at 1718. However, it has often been stated that a "contract of insurance is to be read, in
the event of any ambiguity in its language, in a light most strongly supporting the
insured." Weissman v. Prashker, 405 Pa. 226, 233, 175 A.2d 63, 67 (1961). See also R.
KEETON, supra note 3, § 6.3a, at 351.
20. 99 Mass. 162 (1868).
21. Id at 162-63. The policy in Peny provided for the payment if the insured
"sustained personal injury caused by any accident within the meaning of this policy
• ..and such injuries shall occasion death within ninety days from the happening
thereof ...." Id.at 163.
22. Id.It was stipulated that the insured had been injured at 9:00 a.m. on December 11, 1866 and that he died as a result of the accident at 9:00 a.m. on March
12, 1867. The insurer contended, and the court later determined, that the insured's
death occurred 91 days after the date of the accident under a rule of computation
which included the day of the accident. Id
23. Id In reference to the inconsistency alleged by the plaintiff, the court stated
that "[n]o such inconsistency is apparent to the court. On the contrary, the policy
clearly describes the cases in which the loss of life shall make the company responsible, and limits the liability to such cases." Id.
24. Id at 164.
25. Id
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tions is indicative of the general approach which would be followed
by the courts for many years. 26 Despite the short shrift given by the
Perry court to the beneficiary's "tenor of the policy" argument, 27 this
argument was the forerunner of the public policy arguments that
would eventually be raised in many courts and be adopted by at least
two. 28 Thus, the seed for future judicial recognition of a public policy
argument had been planted as early as 1868.29
The strict construction approach articulated by the Perry court
was subsequently applied uniformly by the courts throughout the
next century, routinely defeating claims made under accidental death
provisions where the death of the insured occurred after the expiration of the policy's time limitation provision. 30 These decisions gave
only summary treatment to the various arguments articulated by the
3
claimants for the nonenforcement of the time limitation provision. '
26. See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3D 1311 (1971). This annotation collects
cases that have involved questions of the validity or construction of time limitation
provisions in accident insurance provisions. Id at 1312.
For a contrast to the strict construction approach of construing time limitations
in accident insurance provisions, see Perry v. Provident Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 103
Mass. 242, 243 (1869) (policy provision providing for weekly disability payments for
non-fatal accidental injuries given broad construction so as to provide coverage where
the insured died as a result of accidental injuries after the expiration of a 90-day time
limitation). For a discussion of the first Perry opinion, see notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of instances in which the courts have declined to
strictly apply general contract principles in interpreting insurance policies, see Hudson, Insuringand Exclusion Clauses in Indi'vidual,Accident andHealth Policies, 1958 INs. L.J.
135.
27. See 99 Mass. at 163. In rejecting the beneficiary's argument, the court failed
to explain why the limitation was not inconsistent with the tenor of the policy. Instead, the court merely stated that there was "[n]o such inconsistency apparent to the
court." Id
28. For cases accepting the public policy arguments, see Karl v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 324-29, 353 A.2d 564, 567-69 (Law Div. 1976),aft'd, 154
N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977); Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451
Pa. 218, 221-23, 301 A.2d 799, 801-02 (1973). For a discussion of Karl, see notes 178203 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Burne, see notes 78-115 and
accompanying text infra.
29. See, e.g., Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564
(Law Div. 1976), affd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977) (time limitation in accidental death benefit provision of life insurance policy should not be read
literally to preclude recovery where death does not occur within specified time following the accident, but rather should be read as requiring that there be "clear and
convincing evidence" that the accident was the cause of death whenever time limitation is exceeded); Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973)
(policy provision that accidental death benefits would be payable only if death occurred within 90 days from the date of accident was contrary to public policy and
unenforceable).
30. For a discussion~of the "strict construction" approach articulated by the
Perry court, see notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra. See Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3D
1311 (1971).
31. See Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3D 1311 (1971).
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In time, however, the courts supplemented their decisions with discussions of the voluntary nature of the contract and the purposes behind
the inclusion and enforcement of time limitations in accidental death
provisions. 32 In the much cited decision of Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 33 although the insurer admitted that the accident was the
sole cause of death, the insurer denied any liability under the policy
because the insured's death occurred beyond the ninety-day period
specified in the policy. 34 In reaching its decision that the time limitation constituted a valid bar to recovery, the court advanced two theories that have been relied upon heavily by courts in succeeding
cases. 35 First, the court, citing Perry, advanced the rationale that the
time limitation, as a provision in a contract, should be strictly interpreted in accordance with principles of contract law. 36 The court
opined that the terms of the policy were "reasonable, clear and unambiguous," 37 and that the insurance policy was a "voluntary contract."'38 The court determined that, because there was no question
as to the terms of the provision and no evidence that it was a contract
32. See, e.g., McKinney v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Co., 211 F.
951 (8th Cir. 1914); Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1899); Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W. 2d 928 (1938). For a
discussion of McK'nney, see notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion
of Brown, see notes 33-47 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Mu/lls,
see notes 48-53 and accompanying text bhfta.
33. 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899). In Brown, the insured had sustained serious
injuries when thrown from a dog cart and died after the expiration of the 90-day time
limitation contained in his policy. As an immediate result of the accident the insured
was wholly disabled and remained in that condition until his death, 106 days after
the accident. Id
34. Id at 936. The policy provided in pertinent part that "if death shall result
from such injuries alone, and within ninety days of the event causing said injuries,
the company will pay $5,000 to Lucy P. Brown (his wife) . . . ." Id (quoting policy
language).
35. Id at 936-37. For a discussion of the first of these theories, see notes 36-40
and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the second of these theories, see
notes 41-44 and accompanying text infra.
36. Id at 936-37. For a discussion of the Perry court's articulation of this rationale, see notes 20-29 and accompanying text supra. See also 95 F. at 937 (citing Perry v.
Provident Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 99 Mass. 162 (1868)).
37. 95 F. at 936-38. When a contract appears to be clear and unambiguous on
its face, its meaning must be ascertained solely from the language used in the contract without resort to extrinsic evidence. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 3-9, at 117 (2d ed. 1977).
38. Id at 936-37. In stating that the insurance policy was a "voluntary contract," permitting the insurer to impose conditions on coverage, the court assumed
that the insured was aware of the 90-day time limitation on coverage. Id. at 937.
The court stated that "[tlhe assured knew the character and extent of the obligations
of the Company when he accepted the policy." Id. Accord Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 688, 117 S.W.2d 928, 930 (1938); Hargrove v. Fidelity Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 196 Pa. Super. 627, 630, 175 A.2d 912, 913 (1961); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788, 793-94 ([ex. Civ. App. 1964).
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of adhesion, 39 the terms were to be "taken in their plain, ordinary and
popular sense," which, therefore, resulted in a denial of recovery
when death occurred outside the specified time period. 40 The second
theory articulated by the court in support of its conclusion that the
time limitation was a valid limitation on recovery was based on the
supposed purpose of the limitation. 4 1 The court reasoned that time
limitations were required in accidental death provisions because of
the insurer's need to limit liability to a specified period in the calculation of premiums.

42

The court also stated that "[ninety] days has

been decided to be a fair length of time for the final result of an acci39. 95 F. at 936-37. The term "contract of adhesion" appears to have first been
used in reference to insurance contracts. See Note, supra note 11, at 150 n.22 (citing
Patterson, The Dehivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. REV. 198 (1919)). Patter-

son stated that, "[F]reedom of contract rarely exists .... Life insurance contracts
are contracts of 'adhesion.' The contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured,
who merely adheres to it, has little choice as to its terms." Patterson, supra, at 222.
The view that insurance policies constitute contracts of adhesion mitigates against
the Brown court's opinion that the insurance policy was a "voluntary contract" and,
therefore, against its conclusion that the insurer had a "right" to impose certain conditions on coverage. See note 38 and accompanying text supra. See generally Daver,
Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis. An Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REV.
1, 2 (1972); Note, Problems Created by the Purchaser'sInabit to Bargain over Life Insurance,
29 IND. L.J. 635 (1954).
Despite the fact that insurance contracts generally appear to be contracts of
adhesion, the adhesion argument has not prevailed in challenges to the enforceability
of accidental death provisions because the courts have found valid purposes underlying the clauses, which have led them to conclude that these provisions are reasonable.
See Note, supra note 11. For a discussion of the court's views of the purposes of the
clause, see notes 32-34, and accompanying text supra. See also notes 41-46 and accompanying text in/ra.
In addition, at least one commentator contends that the adhesion argument to
defeat provisions in insurance contracts has not been successful because most states
have, in effect, transferred the insured's bargaining power to the state by statutory
regulation or prohibition of certain policy language and by requiring approval of all
policy language by the state insurance commissioner. See H. KRUEGER & L. WAGGONER, THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT 79 (1953); Kessler, Forces Shaping
the Insurance Contract, 1954 IND. L.J. 151 (1954). Cf 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 89.43,
89.61(h), 89.80(e), 89.97(d), 133.12 (Shepard's 1978) (prohibition of any language in
accidental death benefit provisions that requires death to occur with a specific time
period).
40. 95 F. at 936-38. In reaching this determination, the court noted that nothing in the principles of common law or in the policy of statutory law called for the
application of a different rule of interpretation. Id.at 938. The court found its support for this determination in part in Article 1176 of the Code Napoleon which provided, "When an obligation has been contracted on condition that an event shall
happen within a limited time, the condition is considered as broken when the time
expired without the event having taken place." Id.(quoting Code Napoleon art.
1176).
41. Id at 937-38.
42. Id at 937. The court made two key presumptions. The court stated, "It is
to be presumed that insurance companies, in formulating policies, adopt the terms
best suited to the purposes of all parties; [and] that in fixing the premium charged it
is necessary to limit the liability to a stated period ......
Id.
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dent . . . [and would] protect the interests of both the insurer and
insured." '43 In addition, the court noted that, although the time limitation provision "may work injury in individual cases, it must be regarded in the same manner as the fundamental principles of
44
government, seeking the greatest good to the greatest number.
Thus, the Brown court, in upholding the time limitation as a valid
and enforceable limitation on coverage, expanded the Perry rationale
by supplementing the strict construction approach with considerations of the alleged purpose underlying the time limitation 45 and the
'46
notion that the insurance policy constituted a "voluntary contract.
In the years following Brown, other courts expanded its two
pronged rationale, while continuing to enforce time limitations in accidental death provisions as valid limitations on coverage. 47 In Mull'ns v. National Casualty Co. 48 a strict construction of the insurance
contract, together with a recognition of the needs of the insurance
industry, prevented equitable considerations, overwhelmingly
favorable to the insured, from defeating the time limitation. Although the insured in Mulhns was struck by a street car, suffered severe skull fractures, developed traumatic pneumonia, was continually
unconscious, and required "herculean" medical efforts to be kept
alive, the insurer denied any liability under the policy because the
insured died five hours after the expiration of the thirty-day time limitation period provided by the policy. 49 In rejecting the beneficiary's
contention that the provision was unconscionable and unreasonable, 50 the court reasoned that the insurer's need to guard against re43. Id Accord Shelton v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 28 Il. App.
2d 461, 469, 171 N.E.2d 787, 791 (1961). Cf Crowe v. North Am. Accident Ins. Co.,
96 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (30-day limitation held to be an unreasonable time for the occurrence of final result, but provision enforced because of the
explicit nature of the policy's terms). It is assumed that the interest of the insured
which the court speaks of as being in need of protection is that of not being overinsured. 95 F. at 937-38.
44. 95 F. at 937-38.
45. Id For a discussion of these purposes as viewed by the Brown court, see
notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
46. 95 F. at 937. For a discussion of a view concerning the "voluntary" nature
of an insurance contract which is contra to that of the Brown court, see note 39 supra.
47. For cases which have expanded upon the two-pronged rationale of Brown see
cases cited in notes 48, 54, 64 & 78 itfra.
48. 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938).
49. Id at 687-88, 117 S.W.2d at 929-30. The court pointed out that the insured's doctor testified that the insured never had a chance to recover and that the
medical efforts merely prolonged his life. Further, it was noted that the insured was
"practically pulseless" for the 24 hours preceding his death. Id at 687, 117 S.W.2d at
929.
50. Id. at 687-88, 117 S.W.2d at 929-30. Cf Crowe v. North Am. Accident Ins.
Co., 96 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (30-day limitation held to be an un-
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covery where there was a question of causation constituted a sound
reason for limiting recovery to deaths occurring within a stipulated
period. 5' The court characterized the policy as a "voluntary contract" 52 and concluded that the clear and unambiguous language imposed no liability on the insurer when death occurred after the time
limitation had expired. 53 The alleged necessity of including time limitations in accidental death provisions as a means of protecting insurers from dubious claims was also advanced by the Eighth Circuit in
McKinney v.General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co. 54 Although, in
the final analysis, the McKinney decision turned on the "voluntary
contract-strict construction" rationale, 55 the court indicated that a
reasonable time for the occurrence of final result of an accident, but provision enforced because of the explicit nature of the policy's terms). In addition, the
beneficiary contended that the policy insured against the "injury causing death,"
that the time of death was not the essence of the policy, and that the insured would
have died but for the extraordinary medical efforts expended on his behalf from
which the insurer should not profit. 686 Ky. at 687-88, 117 S.W.2d at 929-30.
51. 686 Ky. at 688, 117 S.W.2d at 930 (citing McKinney v. General Accident
Fire & Life Assurance Co., 211 F. 951 (8th Cir. 1914)). The court also noted that it
made no difference in the instant case that the time limitation was only 30 days in
duration rather than 90 days as is usually prescribed. Id. at 688, 117 S.W.2d at 930.
In further support of its determination that the time limitation provision was not
"unconscionable or unreasonable" the court cited Clark v. FederalLife Ins. Co. for the
proposition that the small premium received by the insurer for the policy justified the
limited protection received by the insured. 273 Ky. at 689, 117 S.W.2d at 930 (citing
Clark v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 193 N.C. 166, 136 S.E. 291, 293 (1927). Accord Bennett
v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939); Hudson v. Mutual
Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 184 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
52. 273 Ky. at 638, 117 S.W.2d at 930. In echoing the traditionally accepted
"voluntary contract-strict construction" view, the court "presumed" that the insured "knew" the extent of coverage. Id. Similarly, commentators have pointed out
that the clear language of a policy is not to be ignored even though its application in
a given instance may prove to be harsh or not in accord with the purpose of the
insured in obtaining the insurance. Moreover, such language must be followed, in
the absence of fraud, regardless of whether the insured has read and understood the
language. See 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:25, at 688 (2d ed.
1959). Further support for the court's presumption is found in the words of Justice
Holmes in Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, where he stated that "[n]o rational theory of
contract can be made that does not hold the assured to know the contents of the
instrument to which he seeks to hold the other party." 237 U.S. 605, 609 (1915). For
a discussion of the view that insurance policies are not voluntary contracts, but rather
contracts of adhesion, see note 39 supra.
53. 273 Ky. at 688, 117 S.W.2d at 930.
54. 211 F. 951, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1914). In McKinney, the policy provided that the
insurer's liability under the policy would be limited to accidental death occurring
within 90 days from the date of the accident unless the accident was followed by
"immediate, complete and continuous disability." Id. at 951-52. The plaintiff had
admitted in her complaint that the death did not occur within 90 days of the accident and that the accident did not cause immediate, complete, and continuous disability. Id at 953.
55. Id. at 964 (citing Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452 (1894);
Delaware Ins. Co. v. Greer, 120 F. 916 (8th Cir. 1903); Liverpool & London & Globe
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stipulated period during which death must occur following an accidental injury was necessary in order to guard the insurer from being
forced to pay claims where death was not the result of the accidental
injury. 56 The McKinney decision typifies the decisions of the early
twentieth century in that it articulates policy justifications for the enforcement of these time limitations but ultimately supports its decision by reliance on a "voluntary contract-strict construction"
57
approach.
Although the cases which followed the Brown, Mul'ns, and McKinney decisions 58 resulted in very little modifications in the outcome
of the decisions, 59 with an increasing regularity the courts began at
least to address the public policy arguments raised by the beneficiaries. 60 In these decisions, 6 1 the beneficiaries generally attempted to
Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 94 F. 314 (8th Cir. 1899), aj'd, 180 U.S. 132 (1901)). For a
discussion of the "voluntary contract-strict construction" rationale, see notes 36-40
and accompanying text supra.
56. 211 F. at 952. In reaching its determination that the time limitation was a
necessary restriction on coverage the court stated, "It is not difficult to prove by the
mistaken opinions of witnesses that a death which occurs more than 90 days after an
accident . . . was caused by that accident independently of all other causes, even
when the truth is that it was caused by disease alone .......
Id. The court noted
that the insurer had a "moral and legal right" to so limit the liability. Id
57. See id at 952-53. See, e.g., Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899); Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d
928 (1938).
58. For a discussion of McKinne, see notes 54-57 and accompanying text rnfra.
For a discussion of Brown, see notes 33-47 and accompanying text tnfra. For a discussion of Mullins, see notes 48-53 and accompanying text infra.
59. The only change in the outcome of decisions in this period involved judicial
interpretations of time limitation clauses in policies insuring against loss of body
parts. Some courts construed these broadly to allow recovery for the insured. See,
e.g., Life & Casualty Co. v. Ford, 172 Ark. 1098, 292 S.W. 389 (1927) (judgment was
affirmed for the insured's beneficiary although the insured's foot was amputated after
the 30-day time limitation on the ground that the insurance policy provision for payment for "loss of members" within 30 days of the accident did not apply to the loss of
a single member); Westenhouer v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 27 So. 2d 391 (La. Ct.
App. 1946) (judgment for insured's beneficiary although insured's amputation occurred outside the 30-day limitation period on the ground that the limitation merely
required the "loss" of a member within the specified time period and the words "loss"
and "total and permanent severance" [ie., amputation] were not synonymous).
60. See, e.g., Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928
(1938). For a discussion of Mullins, see notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra. In
Mulins, the beneficiary contended, iter aha, that enforcement of the clause would
permit the insurer to profit by the extraordinary medical efforts taken to prolong the
insured's life. Id. at 688, 117 S.W.2d at 929. Although the court did recognize that
the case presented an "appealing situation" it nevertheless held the provision to be a
valid and enforceable limitation on coverage without giving any major consideration
to the beneficiary's public policy argument. Id
61. See, e.g., Bennett v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794
(1939) (30-day limitation in accidental death provision alleged to be violative of public policy); Weickselbaum v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 129
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characterize time limitation provisions as contractual terms which
were "injurious to the public or [which] contravened some established
interest of society," and, therefore, violative of public policy. 6 2 Generally, the claimants argued that requiring the insured's death to occur within a specified time period following the accident would tend
to encourage the beneficiary to deny the insured proper medical
treatment in order to be certain that death would occur within the
time limitation period. 63 For example, in Bennett v. Life & Casualty
Insurance Co., 64 the insurer refused to pay an accidental death indemnity on the ground that the insured's death had occurred eighty-six
days after the accident, and therefore was outside the thirty-day limitation period specified in the policy. 65 In holding for the insurer, the
court stated that the time limitation provision was neither unreasonable nor against public policy and that it was not a wager. 66 However,
the court failed to explain how or why it reached these conclusions. 67
N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.),a~fdmem., 284 A.D. 987, 136 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Div.
1954), appeal denied, 285 A.D. 894, 139 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1955) (90-day limitation in
accidental death provision alleged to be violative of public policy); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (ninety-day limitation
alleged to be violative of public policy). For a discussion of Bennett, see notes 64-67
and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Weickselbaum, see notes 68-71 and
accompanying text infra.
62. See L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 60 (6th Cir. 1968)
(quoting McCullough Transfer Co. v. Virginia Surety Co., 213 F.2d 440, 443 (6th
Cir. 1954)) (cancellation of malpractice insurance for purposes of coercing and intimidating the insured as a witness in pending and future malpractice suits was injurious
to the public and thus a violation of public policy). Accord Porter v. Trustees of
Cincinnati S. Ry., 96 Ohio St. 29, 117 N.E. 20 (1917). The Porter court stated that
"public policy is that principle of law which holds that no person can lawfully do
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.
Id at 33-34, 117 N.E. at 21 (quoting 9 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, Contracts § 481 (1903)). See also Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 (1898). In
Ritter, Justice Harlan stated, "A contract, the tendency of which is to endanger the
public interests or injuriously affect the public good, or which is subversive of sound
morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court of justice or be made the
foundation of its judgment." Id at 154.
63. See, e.g., Weickselbaum v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of
Am., 129 N.Y.S. 2d 612 (N.Y.Sup. Ct.), af'dmem., 284 A.D. 987, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 366
(App. Div. 1954), appeal denied, 285 A.D. 894, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 252 (1955); Douglas v.
Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W. 2d 788, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
64. 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E. 2d 794 (1939). In Bennett, the insured was covered
under a life insurance policy which insured against death resulting from accidental
injury, providing death occurred within 30 days from the date of accident. Id. The
policy provided in pertinent part "that no indemnity will be paid as the result of or
for injuries . . . where death . . .does not occur within thirty days from the date of
the accident." Id. (quoting policy language).
65. Id at 228, 3 S.E.2d at 795.
66. Id. The court also concluded from an analysis of the policy language that
the premiums charged in the policy were adjusted with respect to the limitations
provided therein. Id at 228, 3 S.E.2d at 794.
67. See id at 228, 3 S.E.2d at 794-95.
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Similarly, in Weickselbaum v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association of America, 68 the beneficiary unsuccessfully contended that a
ninety-day limitation clause was inoperative as contrary to public
policy because it provided for "a profit for failing to heal the injured." 69 In granting the insurer's motion for summary judgment,
the court merely cited other decisions which had summarily dismissed
this public policy argument, 70 and concluded that the ninety-day limitation was not repugnant to public policy. 7
Thus, from the late nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, a decisional evolution took place in the courts' justifications as to the validity and enforceability of time limitation clauses in
accidental death provisions. 72 In the late nineteenth century, these
provisions were analyzed strictly in accordance with general contract
principles.7 3 In time, the "strict construction" approach was fortified
' 74
with the notion that insurance policies were "voluntary contracts,
and was later supplemented with considerations of the purposes underlying the creation and enforcement of the time limitation provisions.7 5 Finally, by the mid-twentieth century, the courts began to
recognize the beneficiaries' public policy arguments, but avoided any
real analysis of these arguments. 76 It was not until Burne v. Franklin
Life Insurance Co., 77 that a court addressed these arguments in a
straightforward fashion.
68. 129 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), af'd mem., 284 A.D. 987, 136 N.Y.S.2d
366 (App. Div. 1954), appeal dented, 285 A.D. 894, 139 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1956).
69. 129 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
70. See id. at 613 (citing Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899); Bennett v. Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3
S.E.2d 794 (1939); Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928

(1938)).
71. See 129 N.Y.S.2d at 613. Accord Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374
S.W.2d 788, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
72. For a discussion of this interpretational evolution, see notes 19-71 and accompanying text supra.
73. For a discussion of this strict contract analysis, see notes 19-31 and accompa-_
nying text supra.
74. For a discussion of this fortification of the strict contract analysis, see notes
32-57 and accompanying text supra.
75. For a discussion of this supplementation of the strict contract analysis, see
notes 32-57 and accompanying text supra.
76. For a discussion of decisions where the courts begin to recognize the beneficiaries' public policy arguments, see notes 58-71 and accompanying text supra.
77. 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's opinion in Burne, see notes 78-115 and accompanying text infia.
For a discussion of how other jurisdictions have viewed the rationale espoused in
Bume, see notes 118-224 and accompanying text itnfa.
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BURNE V. FRANKLIN LIFE INSURANCE AND ITS PROGENY:

A

TURN FROM TRADITION

A.

The Burne Rationale

In the leading Pennsylvania decision ruling on the validity of
time limitations in accidental death insurance provisions, Burne v.
Franklin Life Insurance Co., 78 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held

that such a provision was unenforceable as contrary to public policy
and not applicable when there was no dispute as to the cause of
death. 79 In Burne, the insured was rendered a "complete and hopeless

invalid" as a result of being struck by an automobile while crossing a
street.80 The insured required the most sophisticated medical tech-

nology merely to be kept "medically alive" for a four and one half
year period extending from the date of the accident until his eventual

death."'

The insurer, under a life insurance policy containing a

double indemnity provision conditioned on death resulting from accidental means within ninety days from the date of the accident,8 2 paid

only the face amount of the policy, although it conceded that the
injuries sustained were the direct and sole cause of the insured's
death.

3

The beneficiary brought suit against the insurer for the re-

covery of the accidental benefits alleging that the time limitation was
78. 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
79. 451 Pa. at 221-25, 301 A.2d at 801-03 (1973). See generally Note, supra note 1;
Note, supra note 5.
80. 451 Pa. at 220-22, 301 A.2d at 800-01. The court pointed out that
[f]rom the moment of the accident until his death, Mr. Burne's existence
was that of a complete and hopeless invalid, unable to speak, subject to
seizures and requiring constant nursing and medical care. Vast sums of
money were expended by appellant, and the most sophisticated medical
techniques utilized, merely to keep her husband medically alive, albeit in a
vegetative state, for 41/2 years.
Id. at 220, 301 A.2d at 801 (footnote omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id at 22i, 301 A.2d at 801. In 1949 the defendant-insurer issued to the
insured a life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000 and containing a double
indemnity provision for the payment of an additional $15,000 if the insured's death
resulted solely from accidental means. Id at 220, 301 A.2d at 800. The policy also
provided that accidental double indemnity death benefits were payable only if "such
death occurred . . . within ninety days from the date of the accident." Id at 221,
301 A.2d at 801 (quoting policy language).
83. Id at 220-21, 301 A.2d at 801. The court noted that, during this 4t/2 year
period, the insurance carrier suffered no prejudice by the retention of the double
indemnity death proceeds, and that it appeared that the insurance carrier actually
enjoyed an economic benefit by having the use of the funds during the 42-year period rather than having to pay them out at or near the time of the accident. Id at
220 n.1, 301 A.2d at 801 n.I. The premium paid by the insured for the double indemnity coverage amounted to $31.05 per year, whereas the annual premium for the
basic coverage was $467.55. Id at 229 n.I, 301 A.2d at 805 n.1 (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 2
1982-83]

COMMENT

invalid and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 8 4 In support
of its ruling for the beneficiary,8 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
directly addressed the public policy arguments that mitigate against
the validity of time limitation clauses.8 6 In discussing its "strong policy reasons" for holding in favor of the beneficiary in Burne, the court
pointed out that the leading cases upholding this type of time limitation in accidental death provisions predated the modern advancements in medical science that have enabled medical professionals to
become adept at delaying death for an indeterminate time.8 7 Apparently, the court concluded that such advancements make the time
limitation provisions obsolete.8 8 Also, the court noted that it was offended by the "gruesome paradox" created by the allowance of full
double indemnity recovery for the death of an insured who dies instantaneously or within the time limitation specified, and the disallowance of recovery for the death of an insured who has endured the
agony and expense of a long illness. 89 On this basis, the court found
that predicating the insurer's liability on whether death occurred
before or after a fixed date was offensive to the basic concepts and
fundamental objectives of life insurance, 90 and was therefore, unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 9 1 Finally, the court stated that
any such time limitation might adversely affect the insured's opportu84. Id at 221, 301 A.2d at 801. In addition, the beneficiary alleged that "the
policy gave undue prominence to the accidental death provision without corresponding prominence to the ninety-day limitation period," in contravention of § 617(A)(4)
of the Insurance Company Law of 1921. [Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 682, art. VI,
§ 617 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 752 (A)(4) (Purdon 1971))].
451 Pa. at 221 n.2, 301 A.2d at 801 n.2. The court found it unnecessary to rule on
this claim in light of its holding that the time limitation clause was invalid as contrary to public policy. Id.
85. For a concise statement of this ruling, see text accompanying notes 79 & 11213 supra.
86. 451 Pa. at 220-26, 301 A.2d at 801-03. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the beneficiary's public policy arguments, see notes 87-93 and accompanying
text infra. The court also alluded to the ethical and legal issues surrounding euthanasia and potential controversies which could possibly develop with respect to time
limitations in accident insurance policies. Id at 222 n.3, 301 A.2d at 801 n.3. The
court pointed out that it was the purpose of its opinion "not to introduce this controversy into the area of life insurance policies but to forestall it." Id For a general
discussion of the legal and ethical controversy surrounding euthanasia, see Silving,
Euthanasia.- A Study in Comparattve CriminalLaw, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 350 (1954); Symposium-The Medical, Moral, and Legal Implications of Recent Medical Advances, 13 VILL.
L. REV. 732 (1968).
87. 451 Pa. at 221-22, 301 A.2d at 801.
88. See id
89. d. at 222, 301 A.2d at 801-02.
90. Id., 301 A.2d at 802.
91. Id. at 223, 301 A.2d at 802.
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nity to receive optimal medical care, 92 and might further aggravate

93
the mental anguish which generally accompanies such accidents.
However, in discussing these policy considerations the court failed to
specify the degree of weight that each should be accorded. 94 The effect was to leave to speculation both the exact perimeters of the decision and what the outcome would be if the Burne rationale were
applied in a different factual context. 95
Quite apart from a pure public policy basis, the court reasoned
that the ninety-day time limitation possessed "no persuasive decisional support."'96 The court pointed out that the leading cases interpreting the ninety-day limitation were actually resolutions of
situations in which the accidental injury alone was not clearly fatal or
in which there was some problem with causation. 97 These problems,
the court concluded, did not exist in Burne. 98 In distinguishing, but
not explicitly overruling these cases, the Burne court cited Sidebothom v.
Metropoh'tan Life Insurance Co. 99 as being illustrative of its earlier deci°
In Sidebothom, the insured had suffered severe injuries from
sions.U0

92. Id The court pointed out that
the decisions as to what medical treatment should be accorded an accident
victim should be unhampered by considerations which might have a tendency to encourage something less than the maximum medical care on penalty of financial loss if such care succeeds in extending life beyond the 90th
day. All such factors should, whenever possible, be removed from the antiseptic halls of the hospital. Rejection of the arbitrary ninety day provision
does exactly that.
Id

93. 451 Pa. at 222, 301 A.2d at 802. The court opined that such mental anguish
should not be aggravated with concerns of whether the moment of death will permit
or defeat a double indemnity claim. Id.
94. See id.at 220-26, 301 A.2d at 801-03. See also Note, supra note 11, at 155.
95. Pennsylvania eliminated this problem, at least with respect to the issuance
of new policies, by enacting regulations which flatly forbid the use of time limitations
in certain types of policies. See 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 89.43, 89.61(h), 89.80(e),
89.97(d), 133.12 (Shepard's 1978). For an in-depth discussion of events leading to the
adoption of these new regulations, see note 116 and accompanying text nfra.
96. 451 Pa. at 223, 301 A.2d at 802. For a discussion of the court's analysis of
earlier judicial interpretations of the 90-day provision, see notes 97-108 and accompanying text infra.
97. 451 Pa. at 223, 301 A.2d at 802. In the opinion of the court, earlier cases
had viewed the limitation as an arbitrary period designed to govern cases where there
was uncertainty as to causation and were based on the assumption that if death was
in fact the result of an accidental injury it would manifest itself within ninety days.
Id

98. Id at 224, 301 A.2d at 802. For a discussion of how the Burne court distinguished but did not overrule these prior decisions, see notes 99-108 and accompanying text infra.

99. 339 Pa. 124, 14 A.2d 131 (1940).
100. 451 Pa. at 224, 301 A.2d at 802. The supreme court pointed out that the
trial court, in granting the insurer's motion for summary judgment, apparently relied
solely upon Sidebotham. Id at 223, 301 A.2d at 802.
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two different exposures to carbon monoxide and then sustained further injuries during a fall from his hospital bed while recovering from
the carbon monoxide injuries.' 0 ' Because only the last accident (the
fall) was within ninety days of the insured's death, and because it
could not be established that this accident was the sole cause of the
insured's death, the Sidebotlhom court held that there should be no recovery of accidental double indemnity death benefits under a policy
which required that death result solely from accidental bodily injuries
0
The
sustained within ninety days from the date of the accident.l°'
Burne court distinguished Sdebolhom and the early interpretations of
the limitation in two crucial ways.' 0 3 First, in Sidebothom, the injury
was not the type that with any degree of certainty could be regarded
as fatal, whereas in Bume it was clear from the outset that the insured
would eventually die as a result of the accident. 10 4 Secondly, there
existed "distinct causation problems" in Sidebothom which were not
present in Burne, where it was conceded that the injuries sustained in
the accident were the sole cause of death. 0 5 After making these factual distinctions, the court relied upon the "well settled" rule that a
101. 339 Pa. at 126, 14 A.2d at 131. The insured in Sidebotham was covered
under seven industrial life insurance policies, each containing provisions for the payment of double indemnity benefits in the event of an accidental death of the insured.
Id at 125, 14 A.2d at 131. The accidental death benefit provisions provided in pertinent part as follows:
Upon the receipt of due proof that the Insured . . . has sustained . . . bodily injuries, solely through external violent and accidental means, resulting,
directly and independently of all other causes, in the death of the Insured
within ninety days from the date of such bodily injuries . . . the company
will pay in addition to any other sums due under this policy . . . an Accidental Death Benefit equal to the face amount of the insurance then payable at death.
Id. at 126, 14 A.2d at 131 (quoting policy language).
102. 339 Pa. at 127, 14 A.2d at 132. For a statement of the precise policy language interpreted by the court, see note 101 supra.
103. 451 Pa. at 224, 301 A.2d at 802. For a discussion of the basis on which the
Bume court distinguished S'debolhom and other cases upholding the provisions as valid
and enforceable limitations on coverage, see notes 104-05 and accompanying text
bufra.
104. 451 Pa. at 224, 301 A.2d at 802. In Sidebothom it was not clear that the
insured would die as a result of his carbon monoxide poisoning. See 339 Pa. at 126,
14 A.2d at 131.
105. 451 Pa. at 224, 301 A.2d at 802. The Sidebothom court indicated these causation problems when it quoted the trial court's statement that "[a]s the pleading
stands it cannot be said that the last accident was the cause of death independent of
all other causes." 339 Pa. at 127, 14 A.2d at 131-32 (quoting lower court). Although
there were no Pennsylvania decisions upholding such provisions in cases in which
there was no dispute as to causation, the court did not treat at least three decisions in
other jurisdictions where causation was not in dispute. See Bennett v. Life & Casualty Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939); Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273
Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d
788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). For a discussion of Bennett, see notes 64-67 and accompa-
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"provision in an insurance policy [which] cannot reasonably be ap'0 6
plied to a certain factual situation . . . should be disregarded,"'
and concluded that the ninety-day time limitation provision should
not apply in cases like Bume, in which no dispute exists as to the cause
of death. 1 7 The court observed further "that to enforce the ninetyday condition would serve only as a trap to the assured or as a means
' 10 8
of escape for the [insurer].
Given the lengths to which the court went to distinguish prior
case law, it appears that the court did not intend its holding to be
interpreted to mean that all time limitations were void; otherwise, the
nying text supra. For a discussion of Mullins, see notes 48-53 and accompanying text
supra.

106. 451 Pa. at 224, 301 A.2d at 802. The Burne court found support for its
characterization of this rule as "well settled" in the case of Grandin v. Rochester
German Ins. Co., 107 Pa. 26 (1884). In Grandin, the court refused to mechanically
apply a forfeiture insurance provision:
It will thus be seen that where the reason of a condition does not apply
this court has refused to apply it. Other instances of the same kind might
be cited where necessary. We are not to suppose that conditions involving
forfeitures are introduced into policies by insurance companies, which are
purely arbitrary and without reason, merely as a trap to the assured or as a
means of escape for the company in case of loss. When therefore a general
condition has no application to a particular policy; where the reason which
alone gives it force is out of the case, the condition itself drops out with it.
Id. at 37.
At least one commentator has concluded that the court's reliance upon Grandt
was not well founded. See Note, supra note 11, at 163. That commentator states that
Grandin was
no real authority for the application of such a rule in Burne since the court
in Grandin held the disputed provision inapplicable after it had determined
the intent of the parties at the time they entered the bargain. In Burne, the
intent of the parties was not at issue. Thus, it appears that Burne manufac-

tured this "sound rule;" a more obvious example of creative use of precedent would be difficult to find.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
107. 451 Pa. at 225, 301 A.2d at 803. As demonstrative of this principle the
court cited cases interpreting insurance policy provisions, which by their terms precluded recovery for loss of limbs unless the loss occurred within a specified time period following the accident. Id In these cases, claimants were able to recover despite
the fact that the actual amputation occurred after the expiration of the period because they produced medical testimony which established that it was obvious before
the period's expiration that the insured would need the amputation. Id (citing Westenhouer v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 27 So. 2d 391 (La. Ct. App. 1946) (recovery
permitted where insured's right leg amputated after the expiration of a time limitation which required amputation within 30 days from date of accident); Interstate
Life & Accident Co. v. Waters, 213 Miss. 265, 56 So. 2d 493 (1952) (recovery permitted despite policy limitation which required severence within 30 days from date of
accident; amputation was delayed three months, but it was apparent within one week
that leg would have to be amputated)).

The Burne court pointed out that the beneficiary was prepared to establish
through medical testimony that physicians knew within the 90-day period that the
insured would die as a result of his accident. Id at 225, 301 A.2d at 803.
108. Id at 235, 301 A.2d at 803.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 2

1982-83]

COMMENT

conclusion and factual distinctions made by the court would be mere
verbiage. 0 9 Thus, in addition to resulting in an outcome which runs
contrary to that of the majority of jurisdictions,' 10 the Bume decision
is also problematic because it is subject to several interpretations.' 11
Read broadly, Burne could stand for the proposition that all time limitations in accidental death provisions of accident and life insurance
policies are contrary to public policy and unenforceable.1 2 Under a
limited interpretation of Burne, however, such time limitations might
be found unenforceable only when there exists no dispute that the
13
accident was the cause of death.'
It appears, therefore, that if the establishment of causation is
conceded by the insurer, the time limitation will not be enforced
under either of the possible interpretations of Burne. However, under
the limited interpretation of Burne, the time limitation provision may
be applied in cases where the record establishes a dispute as to the
cause of death. Such an interpretation is supported by the court's
efforts to distinguish, rather than disregard, prior leading decisions on
the grounds that they presented causation questions not present in
Burne, 114 and involved injuries which could not with any degree of
109. See 451 Pa. at 238-41, 301 A.2d at 805-11 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). In
rejecting the majority's holding, Justice Pomeroy opined that the holding was "not
only without precedent in judicial decisions, but . . . also without justification in
fact." Id at 239, 301 A.2d at 810 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Justice Pomeroy indicated that the majority overlooked the intent of the parties and violated fundamental
principles of contract law. Id at 238-41, 301 A.2d at 805-11 (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting).
110. Under the majority view time limitations in accidental death provisions are
upheld as valid and enforceable limitations on coverage. See IC J, APPLEMAN, supra
note 1, § 612, at 128-30. See also Note, supra note 5, at 600. See generally Annot. 39
A.L.R. 3D 1311, 1311-13 (1971).
111. See 451 Pa. at 220-27, 301 A.2d at 801-04. See also d at 234, 301 A.2d at
807 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). See generally Note, supra note 5, at 603-04. For a discussion of this interpretational problem, see notes 112-15 and accompanying text in/ra.
112. See 451 Pa. at 220-24, 301 A.2d at 801-02. See also id. at 228-41, 301 A.2d at
805-11 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
113. See id at 225, 301 A.2d at 803. See also id at 228-41, 401 A.2d at 805-11
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
114. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's distinction of its earlier Sidebotham decision, see notes 96-108 and accompanying text supra. Justice Pomeroy pointed out what he perceived as a flaw in the majority's reasoning:
Were the first interpretation intended (all 90-day provisions void), then it
would be idle to distinguish a case in which the 90 day provision appeared
[and was upheld as valid and enforceable]; the case would simply be overruled. It would appear to follow that not all such clauses are meant to be
stricken, and that the validity of such a provision thus depends entirely
upon whether the insured. . . died beyond the time limitation and without
"some possible uncertainty" as to causation.
451 Pa. at 234-35, 301 A.2d at 807-08 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
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15
certainty be regarded as fatal at the time of the accident.'
No reported Pennsylvania decision has considered the scope of
the Burne rationale in the context of an action for the recovery of
insurance benefits. However, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, in 1978, principally relying upon Burne, adopted regulations
which prohibit the requirement that death occur within any specific
time period in any provision for accidental death benefits. 1 6 These
regulations lend credence to the position that Burne is subject to a

115. For a discussion of the Burne court's factual distinguishing of earlier cases,
see notes 96-108 and accompanying text supra.
116. See 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 89.43, 89.61(h), 89.80(e), 89.97(d), 133.12
(Shepard's 1978). These regulations provide that "[nlo provision for accidental death
benefit may contain any requirement that death must occur within any specific time
period." Id For a discussion of the events leading up to the adoption of these regulations, see Breenan & Delgado,supra note 1, at 1331 n.41. In addition to serving as the
basis for these regulations, Burne has been relied upon in Pennsylvania in several
other contexts.
Shortly after the Bume decision, the Pennsylvania Attorney General issued an
opinion concerning the effect that the Burne decision should have on the enforcement
of Pennsylvania law with respect to the type of language that the Insurance Commissioner should consider as acceptable in accidental death benefit clauses. See Time
Limitations in Accidental Benefit Policies, 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 74 (1974), reprintedin 65
Pa. D. & C.2d 17 (1974). In his opinion the Attorney General stated that
[b]y permitting double indemnification after four and one-half years, the
[Burne] court implicitly held that any time period limitation restricting recovery of accidental death benefits where death is caused by accident is
invalid. We are, therefore, of the opinion that any time limitation, regardless of how long, might be arbitrary and capricious and thus void as against
public policy. . . . [AJII time limitations in regardto accidentaldeath clauses in all
hhes of insurancecan be consideredvoid as contraty to publicpolicy. Insurance policies that have been approved by the Insurance Department containing like
clauses may be disapproved to exclude such provisions. By the same token,
all new policies that are submitted to the Insurance Department for its approval may be disapproved if they contain such a clause.
Id at 24-25 (emphasis added).
On two other occasions, authoritative pronouncements have been made concerning the scope of the Burne opinion. The first involved an attempt by an insurance
carrier to have several insurance riders approved by the Pennsylvania Insurance
Commissioner. See INA Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Dep't, 31 Pa. Commw.
416, 376 A.2d 670 (1977). In INA, life insurance riders had been rejected by the
Insurance Commissioner on the purported authority of Bume and Attorney General
Opinion No. 22. Id. at 418-19, 376 A.2d at 672. Upon receipt of the rejection, INA
sought review of the Commissioner's decision in Commonwealth Court. Id at 419,
376 A.2d at 672. Although this decision did not involve a beneficiary attempting to
recover under such a policy, the opinion did squarely address the issue of whether all
time limitations were void as against public policy. See id.at 421-24, 376 A.2d at 67374. In affirming the Commissioner's decision that any time limitation in an accidental death benefit provision violated public policy as pronounced in Burne, the court
stated that the Bume rationale extended well beyond its factual perimeters. See id.at
423, 376 A.2d at 674. In addition, the court rejected INA's contention that such a
time limitation was necessary to protect insurers from having to pay benefits on
doubtful claims. Id In its rejection, the court stated that INA's contention "ignores
the fact that in all instances when a claim is filed, it is the claimant's burden to prove
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broad interpretation, however, the Burne decision has been read in a
more limited manner in other jurisdictions.I1 7
B.

The Re'ection of the Burne Rationale

In the ten years since Burne, all but two jurisdictions" 8 which have
considered the validity of time limitations in accidental death benefit
provisions have upheld the limitations as valid and enforceable limi9
tations on coverage. 11
These decisions, although traditional in result,
have addressed the public policy arguments in a more straightforward fashion than did decisions prior to Burne. 120 The first reported
decision to address the public policy argument after the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision in Burne was Rihoades v. Equitable Life Assurance Soct'e of the United States. 121 In Rhoades, the Ohio Supreme Court
entitlement to benefits. If the passage of time obscures the cause of death, the claimant's burden becomes all the heavier." Id
Secondly, in 1978, the Insurance Department adopted regulations which prohibit the requirement that death must occur within any specific time period in any
provision for accidental death benefits. See 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 89.43, 89.61(h),
89.80(e), 89.97(d), 133.12 (Shepard's 1978).
117. See e.g., Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564
(Law Div. 1976), aft'd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977). For a
discussion of Karl, see notes 178-203 and accompanying text infra.
118. See National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App. 3d 326,
174 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981); Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353
A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1976), afd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977).
For a discussion of NaionalLi, see notes 204-24 and accompanying text tnfra. For a
discussion of Karl, see notes 178-203 and accompanying text infia.
119. See, e.g., Kirk v. Financial Sec. Life Ins. Co., 75 Ill.
2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144
(1978), rev'g, 54 Ill.
App. 3d 192, 369 N.E.2d 340 (1977); Fontenot v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the U.S., 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E. 2d 643 (1978). For a discussion of K'rk,
see notes 148-70 and accompanying text inja. For a discussion of Fontenol, see notes
133-47 and accompanying text zhfra. For a discussion of Rhoades, see notes 121-32 and
accompanying text infra. For a summary of these opinions, see notes 168-70 and
accompanying text. See also Hardee v. Kilpatrick Life Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 982 (La.
Ct. App. 1979). In Hardee, the court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the
insurer where the accidental death policy required that the insured die within 90
days from the date of the accident; the insured died 111 days after an industrial
accident. Id Although the opinion in Hardee dealt primarily with procedural questions concerning summary judgment, the court did cite its prior opinion in Fontenot
for the proposition that the 90-day clause was not contrary to public policy. See id.at
985 (citing Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978)).
120. For exemplary pre-Burne cases, see McKinney v. General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Co., 211 F. 951 (8th Cir. 1914); Brown v. United States Casualty Co.,
95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899); Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117
S.W.2d 928 (1938). For a discussion of these decisions and the decisional approaches
employed, see notes 33-57 and accompanying text supra. See also IC J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 1, § 612, at 128-31 (applying a pure contract construction analysis to time
limitations); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 1311, 1320 (1971) (providing state-by-state list of
cases upholding time limitation provisions).
121. 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1978).
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expressly considered and rejected the Burne public policy arguments,
basing its decision on the intent of the parties and the principle of
freedom of contract. 122 The insured in Rhoades was covered under an
accidental death policy with a ninety-day limitation provision. 2 3 As
the result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident, the insured
was intermittently hospitalized, and eventually died 116 days after
the date of the accident. 24 The insurer claimed that the insured's
125
and
death was not the direct independent result of the accident,
that the insured did not die within ninety days after the accident as
required by the policy. 126 When the action finally came before the
Ohio Supreme Court, 127 the Court held that the time limitation was
not void as against public policy and would not be against public
policy even if there were no real question concerning proximate causation.' 28 The court stated that it was the intent of the parties that
the beneficiary be compensated only if the insured died within ninety
days of the accident.' 29 Further, the court noted that it could not
rewrite an insurance contract so as to provide coverage which it
might consider equitable unless the contract could be deemed contrary to public policy. 130 The court concluded that "to hold the
122. Id at 47-48, 374 N.E.2d at 645.

123. Id at 45, 374 N.E.2d at 644.
124. Id. at 45-46, 374 N.E.2d at 644. On September 13, 1974, the insured was

injured and hospitalized until her release on October 11, 1974 (29 days). Id at 46,
374 N.E.2d at 644. On December 21, 1974 the insured was readmitted to the hospital, but was discharged on January 5, 1975. The insured died 2 days later, 116 days
after the accident. Id The cause of death was recorded as "cardiac arrest; acute
myocardial infarction (recent)."
125. Id The parties had stipulated that "[a] substantial question of fact exists
as to whether or not Mr. Rhoades' death was the result, directly or independently of
all other causes, of injuries caused directly and exclusively by external, violent and
purely accidental means." Id
126. Id. For a discussion of the facts surrounding the insured's death, see note
124 and accompanying text supra.
127. After making a preliminary determination that there existed a substantial
question as to whether the insured's death was the result of the accident, the trial
court nevertheless granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the indemnification provision was effective only if the insured died within 90
days of the accident. 54 Ohio St. 2d at 46, 374 N.E.2d at 644. The Ohio Court of
Appeals reversed this judgment and remanded the action, holding that the time limitation was contrary to public policy and unenforceable. Id The action came before
the Ohio Supreme Court upon a motion to certify the record. Id.
128. Id. at 48 n.3, 374 N.E.2d at 645 n.3. The court stated that it need not
distinguish the facts of Rhoades from those of Bume concerning causation, since in its
view, time limitation provisions were not against public policy. Id For a discussion
of the facts of Burne, see notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
129. 54 Ohio St. 2d at 47, 374 N.E.2d at 645. The court noted that, having
determined the intent of the parties, any death occurring outside the limited time

period, although accidentally caused, was not compensable. Id.
130. Id at 48, 374 N.E.2d at 645.
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ninety day limitation provision void as against public policy would
constitute an unwarranted infringement upon the right of freedom to
contract.' 13' Thus, the Rhoades court addressed the public policy argument, but chose to dispose of this argument on the basis of the
32
contract rationale espoused in earlier decisions.
A second decision explicitly rejecting the Burne rationale was Fontenot v. New York Life Insurance Co. 133 In Fontenot, the insured's policy
called for the payment of accidental death benefits if the insured's
134
death occurred within ninety days from the date of an accident.
The insured accidentally sustained severe bodily injuries in a motor
vehicle accident and required continuous hospitalization from the
date of the accident until his death 105 days later. 35 The insurer
paid only the face amount of the policy, claiming that the additional
accidental death benefits were not due because death did not occur
within the ninety-day limitation period.13 6 On appeal to the Court of
Appeal of Louisiana, 137 the court explicitly rejected the beneficiary's
reliance on Burne, 138 and held that the ninety-day provision was a
valid and enforceable limitation on coverage, and was not violative of
public policy.' 3 9 In reaching this decision, the court recognized that
131. Id. The court pointed out that the claim of liability espoused by the plaintiff was not within the intent of the parties to the insurance contract and that the
court knew "of no public policy justification for ignoring the language of a contract
in order to impose liability on a defendant insurer for a loss not contemplated by the
contract." Id (quoting Shelton v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 28 11.
App. 2d 461, 469, 171 N.E.2d 787, 797 (1961)). In reaching this conclusion, the court
stated that the proper test for determining whether a provision in an insurance contract is void as against public policy is whether the provision's purpose is "injurious to
the public or contravenes some established interest of society." Id (quoting
L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 60 (6th Cir. 1968)). As viewed by
the Rhoades court, the purpose of this time limitation was to eliminate disputes concerning the proximate cause of death. 54 Ohio St. 2d at 48, 374 N.E.2d at 645.
Finding this purpose to be neither injurious to the public nor in contravention of any
societal interest, the court concluded that the provision served a "legitimate societal
function" and was therefore not void as against public policy. Id. (citing Brown v.
United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899)).
132. 54 Ohio St. 2d at 47, 374 N.E.2d at 645. For a discussion of the Rhoades
Court's analysis, see notes 127-31 and accompanying text supra.
133. 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
134. Id. at 1186. The 90-day limitation applied to the payment of double indemnity benefits. Id. The face value of the policy was payable regardless of the time
of death, providing death occurred within the term of the policy. Id.
135. Id. The stipulated cause of death was "respiratory and cardiac arrest due
to cerebral anoxia and spinal cord injury." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1185. The beneficiaries appealed the trial court's judgment for the
insurer and its determination that the time limitation was valid. Id at 1186.
138. Id at 1187-88. For a discussion of the court's treatment of Bume, see text
accompanying notes 139-47 ifra.
139. 357 So. 2d at 1187-88. In reaching its decision, the court noted that it is
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the Burne rationale presented an alternative interpretation, but cited
as the "better view" the many cases that have upheld the provision as

a valid and enforceable limitation on coverage.

40

As viewed by the

Fontenot court, the purpose of the provision is to "minimize uncer-

tainty and dispute as to the cause of death allegedly due to accidental
means by preventing the accident from becoming too remote in
time."' 14 1 In addition, the court found that the fact that insurance

companies set their rates for coverage in reliance upon data pertaining to death within the specified period was "important and supportive" of the validity of.time limitations. 42 Finally, in discussing the
Bume rationale, the court described as "absurd and unsound" the
suggestion in Burne that the time limitation would negatively impact
1
on the insured's opportunity to receive optimal medical care. 43
Thus, while the Fontenot court did make references to, and rely in
part on, the contract rationale which formed the basis of earlier decisions, 14 4 the court addressed at least one of the two arguments underpinning the Burne rationale 45 and reached a contrary decision on the

basis of its perception of the proper public policy and the weight of
the countervailing authority. 146 Such a decision is in contrast to
Rhoades in which the Court merely recognized the Burne public policy
argument, but based its decision entirely on the principle of the free-

dom of contract. 147
A third decision to explicitly reject the Burne rationale was that
of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Kirk v. FnancialSecury Life Insur"well settled law" that insurers are at liberty to impose conditions and limitations on
their liability "so long as such conditions and limitations do not conflict with statutory law or offend public policy." Id (citing Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193
La. 605, 192 So. 72 (1939)). The court pointed out that the language of the policy
was not ambiguous and its intent and meaning were "crystal clear." Id at 1187.
Further, the court found that the policy was not in conflict with Louisiana statutory
law which explicitly permits an insurer to limit its coverage liability under such policies. Id
140. Id at 1188.
141. Id.
142. Id
143. Id (quoting Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. at 237, 301 A.2d at
809 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting)).
144. Id at 1187. For a discussion of the Rhoades court's application of the contract rationale, see notes 138-51 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
other cases which have relied on this "contract rationale," see notes 20-57 and accompanying text supra.
145. See 357 So. 2d at 1187-88. The court addressed the public policy aspect of
Burne. Id.
146. Id at 1187-88. For a discussion of the Fontenot court's analysis, see notes
133-44 and accompanying text supra.
147. For a discussion of Rhoades, see notes 121-32 and accompanying text supra.
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ance Co. 148 In Kirk, the insured's accidental death benefit was conditioned on the insured's death as a result of accidental injury within
ninety days of the accident.1 49 The insured was involved in an auto
accident resulting in severe injuries which caused him to be placed in
intensive care; he required "extraordinary measures" merely to be
kept alive. 150 From the date of the accident until his death, ninetytwo days later, the insured was given little chance of survival. 15 The
insurer paid the face value of the policy, but refused to pay the accidental death benefit because the insured did not die within the
ninety-day period provided in the policy.152 On appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court from the decision below holding that the ninety-day
limitation was contrary to public policy, 153 the court reversed, holding that the time limitation was not clearly against public policy and
that, therefore, the beneficiary was not entitled to the double indem154
nity benefits.
In support of its decision, the court not only categorically addressed and rejected the public policy considerations in Burne, '55 but
also enunciated policy considerations of its own.1 56 In first addressing
the policy considerations espoused by the majority in Bume, the court
148. 75 Ill. 2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144 (1978), rev'g, 54 Ill. App. 3d 192, 369 N.E.2d
340 (1977).
149. 54 Ill. App. 3d at 193, 369 N.E.2d at 341.
150. Id.
151. 75 111.2d at 370, 389 N.E.2d at 145.
152. Id The court pointed out that the policy "specifically limited double indemnity recovery to death occurring within 90 days of the fatal accident." Id
153. 54 Il. App. 3d at 197-98, 369 N.E.2d at 344. The beneficiary's action,
based on the allegation that the 90-day time limitation violated public policy, was
orally dismissed by the trial court. Id at 192, 369 N.E.2d at 341. On appeal to the
Illinois appellate court, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the action remanded on a finding that the 90-day limitation was contrary to public policy. Id.
(citing Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973)).
154. 75 Ill. 2d at 371, 389 N.E.2d at 145 (1978). The court concisely framed the
"primary question" posed in the appeal as "whether this unambiguous 90-day requirement violates Illinois public policy." Id at 370, 389 N.E.2d at 145. The court
also indicated that, while this issue had not yet been addressed by the Illinois
Supreme Court, several Illinois appellate courts had approved this type of time limitation. Id at 372, 389 N.E.2d at 146 (citing Hickey v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 302
Ill. App. 388, 23 N.E.2d 933 (1939) (upholding provision in accident insurance policy
which limited benefits to instances where the insured died within 30 days of the accident); Clarke v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 180 Il. App. 300 (1913) (insurer's
refusal to pay under a double indemnity provision upheld where the insured died
beyond the policy's 90-day limitation period)).
155. 75 Ill. 2d at 373-80, 389 N.E.2d at 146-48. For a discussion of the court's
treatment of the policy considerations in Bume, see notes 159-63 and accompanying
text injra.
156. 75 Ill. 2d at 373-80, 389 N.E.2d at 148-49. For a discussion of the court's
policy considerations in support of upholding the validity and enforceability of such
limitations, see notes 164-67 and accompanying text ihfra.
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rejected as "unpersuasive" the argument that time limitations should
be abandoned in light of the advancements made by the medical profession in defining death. 157 In addition, the court posited that the
"suggestion that the injection of financial matters may detrimentally
affect [medical] decisions by double indemnity life insurance benefi158
ciaries [was] not substantiated by the case at bar."'
The court also pointed out that, although some states have no
clearly defined public policy on this matter, this was not the case in
Illinois.' 59 The court noted that the public policy of Illinois in the
area of insurance was embodied in the Illinois Insurance Code which
gives the Insurance Director the duty to make judgments as to the
validity of various policy provisions. 60 Further, it was pointed out
that the ninety-day limitation had been specifically authorized in the
Insurance Department's "Rules and Regulations,"' 6' and that the
long-established approval of such limitations by the Director, in the
absence of any countermanding action by the legislature, evidenced
62
that the legislature did not consider them violative of public policy.'
157. 75 11. 2d at 378, 389 N.E.2d at 149 (citing Note, supra note 1, at 860). The
court noted that there would always be those who will die immediately following the
expiration of the policy's time limitation period, despite the state of the art of healing
or preserving life. Id at 378, 389 N.E.2d at 149.
158. Id. at 378, 389 N.E.2d at 149. The court noted that, contrary to the Burne
court's contention concerning the injection of financial matters into medical decisions, the beneficiary in KGrk maintained the insured's life for more than 90 days
despite the 90-day limitation provisions. Id Thus, the court concluded that the limitation provision "did not act as a disincentive in the provision of medical services."
Id. In addition, the court noted that this issue was already dealt with by the concept
of "insurable interest." Id at 379, 389 N.E.2d at 149. For a general discussion of the
concept of "insurable interest, see R. KEETON, supra note 3, §§ 3.3-3.5, at 101-128; W.
VANCE, supra note 5, §§ 28-34, at 156-208.
159. 75 Il. 2d at 374-76, 389 N.E.2d at 148 (citing Smith v. Board of Educ., 405
11. 143, 89 N.E.2d 893 (1950); Routt v. Barrett, 396 Ill. 322, 71 N.E.2d 660 (1947);
Pearson v. Adams, 394 11. 391, 68 N.E.2d 777 (1946)). The court noted that the
legislature had not been silent on the issue of public policy in relation to the contents
of insurance policies. Id
160. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 73, 1013 (1977). Section 1013 provides in pertinent part, "The Director is charged with the rights, powers and duties
appertaining to the enforcement and execution of all insurance laws of this State. He
shall have the power (a) to make reasonable rules and regulations as may be necessary for making effective such laws." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1013 (1977).
161. 75 Ill. 2d at 376-77, 389 N.E.2d at 147-48 (citing Department of Insurance
Rule 20.07, § 7(a)(10), 2 ILL. ADMIN. REG. 57 (July 28, 1978)). Insurance Rule 20.06
authorizes the following language: "Accidental death and dismemberment benefits
shall be payable if the loss occurs within 90 days from the date of the accident . ... "
2 ILL. ADMIN. REG. 57 (July 28, 1978). Cf 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 89.43, 89.61(h),
89.80(e), 89.97(d), 133.12 (Shepard's 1978) (prohibiting time limitations in accidental
death provisions). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania regulations, see note 116
supra.
162. 75 Ill. 2d at 376-78, 389 N.E.2d at 148. The court noted that, although
approval of these provisions by the Insurance Department was not binding upon the
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The court concluded, therefore, that the matter was one better left to
the Insurance Department and the legislature. 163 The court then
elaborated on the policy considerations favoring the validity and enforceability of time limitation provisions.1 64 The court noted that
"these provisions minimize uncertainty as to the cause of the assured's
death"' 16 5 with the concomitant effect of eliminating a substantial
amount of litigation. 66 The court also indicated that these provisions
reflect decisions by the insurance company concerning the premiums
67
to be charged.
Thus, although the Kirk court reached the same outcome as Fontenot and Rhoades, its analysis ventured beyond these decisions by not
only addressing and dismissing the major arguments underpinning
the Burne public policy rationale, 68 but also by formulating public
policy considerations of its own and looking to state statutes for guidance in the determination of the state's public policy. 169 Such an
analytical approach is in sharp contrast with Fontenot and Rhoades
which only superficially addressed the Burne public policy
70

rationale. 1

courts, they were nevertheless entitled to great weight against a contention that the
approved provisions violated public policy. Id.
163. Id at 376-78, 389 N.E.2d at 148. However, the court did indicate that
"there may be valid reasons which support the validity of the decision in Burne. " Id.
at 377, 389 N.E.2d at 148.
164. Id at 376-78, 389 N.E.2d at 148. Although the court stated that there were
"numerous policy arguments favoring the 90 day limitation," the court clearly articulated only three. Id For a discussion of the policy arguments favoring time limitations espoused in Kirk, see text accompanying notes 165-67 1nfra.
165. Id at 377, 389 N.E.2d at 148 (citing Clarke v. Illinois Commercial Men's
App. 300, 303 (1913). See also Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357
Ass'n, 180 Ill.
So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
U.S., 54 Ohio St. 45, 374 N.E.2d 643, 645 (1978).
166. 75 I1. 2d at 377-78, 389 N.E.2d at 148. The court posited that without the
finality provided by such time limitations, the uncertainty surrounding the cause of
death, which increases with the length of time between injury and death, would
"spawn a substantial amount of litigation as benficiaries attempt to establish some
injury-connected cause of their insured decedent's death." Id
167. Id at 378, 389 N.E.2d at 148. The court determined that, as a matter of
contract law, the limitation constitutes a "reasonable . . . reflection of the insurer's
risk," and that the insured is merely receiving that for which he paid. Id. (citing
Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935, 937 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899); Shelton v.
App. 461, 464, 171 N.E.2d 787
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 28 Ill.
(1961); Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (La. Ct. App.
1978).
168. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the Burne rationale, see notes 15563 and accompanying text supra.
2d at 378, 389 N.E.2d at 148. For a discussion of the court's opinion
169. 75 Ill.
in Kirk, see notes 148-67 and accompanying text supra.
170. See, e.g., Hardee v. Kilpatrick Life Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 982 (La. Ct. App.
1979); Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978);
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In the final reported decision to address the public policy argument after Burne, the District Court of Appeal of Florida in Baines v.
Southern Life &Health Insurance Co. 171 upheld the refusal of payment of

accidental death benefits by an insurer where the insured's policy
specified that death must result within ninety days, but where the
insured died 120 days after the date of the accident. 172 In reaching its
decision, the court recognized the argument advanced in Burne that
the beneficiary of the insured might "pull the plug" in order to get
the insurance proceeds, 173 but reasoned that without a "showing of
any tendency on the part of the public to engage in murder or suicide
in order to defeat the time limitations and collect on accident insurance.

. .

any change [with respect to public policy] must come from

the legislature."' 174 The court nevertheless indicated that a different
outcome might have resulted had the court been faced with a record
depicting an insured who was comatose from the moment of the accident or who remained alive "solely by reason of some mechanical device," rather than a record which merely involved an insured who
suffered injuries in an accident which later caused his death. 75 The
Haines dicta is significant in that it highlights the important factual
distinction between cases involving both a causation dispute and an
uncertainty of eventual death at the time of the accident, and cases in

which causation is clear and eventual death is almost certain at the
time of the accident. 176 This distinction, implicitly recognized by the
Haines court, constitutes the basis of the argument for a limited interRhoades v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d
643 (1978). For a discussion of Fontenot, see notes 133-47 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of Rhoades, see notes 121-32 and accompanying text supra.
171. 363 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
172. Id The court noted that the claimant conceded that, under the then-existing Florida law, the 90-day limitation would have been upheld as a valid limitation on coverage. Id (citing Stinchomb v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 84 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 318 So. 2d 402 (1974) (leg amputation occurred 73 days
after the expiration of a 90-day limitation period).
173. Id. at 176 (citing Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353
A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1976); Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799
(1973)). For a discussion of Karl, see notes 178-203 and accompanying text infra. For
a discussion of Burne, see notes 78-115 and accompanying text supra.
174. 363 So. 2d at 176.
175. Id Although not indicated by the court, the hypothetical factual situation
which it posited closely resembles the factual situation in Burne v. FranklinLife Ins. Co.,
451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 729 (1973). For a discussion of Burne, see notes 78-115 and
accompanying text supra.
176. For a discussion of the significance of this factual distinction under the
different possible interpretations of Burne, see notes 109-15 and accompanying text

infra.
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pretation of Burne. 177
C.

A Limited Inlerpretalzbn of Burne: Karl v. New York Life
Insurance Co.

Only one jurisdiction has adopted, at least in part, the rationale
espoused in Burne. 178 In Karl v. New York Life Insurance Co., 179 an action was brought by an insured's beneficiary to recover under the accidental death benefit provisions of two life insurance policies, one
providing that death must occur within ninety days and the other,
one hundred and twenty days. 180 The insured had suffered severe
brain and skull injuries during a criminal assault and died eleven
months later without ever regaining normal physical or mental functioning. 18 1 The insurer paid the face amount of each policy to the
insured's beneficiary, but refused to pay the accidental death benefits. 182 This refusal was based on the grounds that the death occurred
177. For a discussion of Burne and the implications of a qualified or broad interpretation of Burne, see notes 78-115 accompanying text supra.
178. Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Law
Div. 1976), af'd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977). For a discussion
of the court's analysis of the public policy issue in Karl, see notes 180-203 and accompanying text infra.
179. 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1976), aftd, 154 N.J. Super.
182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977).
180. Id at 320, 353 A.2d at 565. The time limitations were 90 days under a
policy issued in 1955 and 120 days under a policy issued in 1963. Id at 321, 353 A.2d
at 565. The 1955 policy provided in pertinent part that:
The Company will pay to the beneficiary . . . an additional amount (the

Double Indemnity Benefit) equal to the face amount of this policy upon
receipt of due proof that the insured's death resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from accidental bodily injury and that such death
occurred within 90 days of such injury.
Id., 353 A.2d at 566. The 1963 policy provided in pertinent part that "the Company
will pay the Accidental Death Benefit, as part of the policy's death benefit proceeds,
upon due proof that the Insured's death resulted directly, and independently of all
other causes, from accidental bodily injury and that such death occurred within 120
days after such injury." Id at 321-22, 353 A.2d at 566. The insured's death occurred
334 days after the criminal assault. Id
181. Id at 322-24, 353 A.2d at 566-67. Unlike other leading cases which primarily involved automobile accidents, the insured in Karl was the victim of a criminal assault. Id at 322, 353 A.2d at 566. The insured, in addition to "drastic brain
surgery" performed upon his admission to the hospital on January 6, 1969, underwent four additional surgical procedures before he was transferred to a nursing home
on June 13, 1969. Id. The insured remained at the nursing home until his transfer
back to the hospital on August 13, 1969, where he remained until his death on December 6, 1969 (334 days following the accident). Id In addition, the record indicated that the insured was totally paralyzed from the date of the accident until his
death, except that he was occasionally able to squeeze with one hand in response to a
command. Id The insured also required a tracheotomy to permit breathing, was
never able to speak, and could neither feed himself nor eat a normal diet. Id
182. Id at 321, 353 A.2d at 565. The face amount of each policy was $10,000
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after the expiration of the time period specified in the policies,18 3 and
that the insured's death was not caused solely by the accident, but
was partially the result of an intervening lung infection. 184 The trial
court, having heard the expert testimony of both parties during the
course of a non-jury trial,18 5 disposed of the causation issue by concluding that it had been "clearly and convincingly established" that
the insured died as the direct result, independently of all other causes,
from the accidental bodily injury he received during the criminal assault.1 86 The court then noted that the time limitation provision
should not be read literally to preclude recovery where death does not
occur within the specified time following an accident, 8 7 but rather
should be read as requiring that there be "clear and convincing evidence" that the accident was the cause of death whenever the time
limitation is exceeded. 8 8 Although the court acknowledged the mass
of precedent based largely on strict contractual interpretation of the
183. Id.
184. Id For the text of the pertinent policy provision relied upon by the insurer,
see note 180 supra.
185. 139 N.J. Super. at 324, 353 A.2d at 567. Testimony of the treating neuro.surgeon indicated that the insured had suffered an acute subdural hemotoma immediately following the accident and that it was common that a person so injured would
die in a relatively short period after the accident that gave rise to the injury. d. at
323, 353 A.2d at 566. The treating neurosurgeon testified that, although some persons survive such a condition, he never expected the insured to survive, and he was
surprised at the length of time that the patient lived following the accident. Id. Further, he testified that even though his patient's condition was complicated by various
infections, "such infections were the normal and predictable consequence of the
breakdown of various bodily functions which invariably follows massive brain injury." Id. Thus, it was the treating physician's opinion that "the insured died as the
direct and inevitable result of the injuries sustained during the assault upon him on
January 6, 1969." Id. However, the defendant insurer offered the testimony of another neurosurgeon who concluded that the insured "had not died of brain damage
alone." Id. at 324, 353 A.2d at 567. In his opinion, the lung infection was at least to
some extent independent of the brain injury and might have been attributable to a
lung injury suffered by the insured some years before. Id
186. Id The court concluded that "the infection existing at the time of Karl's
death was a normal part of the pathology resulting from the massive traumatic brain
damage and does not amount in any legally significant sense to an independent cause
of death." Id The court noted that the insurer's expert witness had neither treated
nor observed the insured and that his expert opinion was based solely on a study of
the insured's medical records. Id
187. Id The court recognized that the majority view is to give literal enforcement to the time limitation provisions and thereby to preclude recovery where death
does not occur within the specified period, and further noted that "as a matter of
basic legal philosophy, there is a great deal to be said for giving straightforward effect
to clear contractual language." Id at 324-25, 353 A.2d at 567.
188. Id at 327, 353 A.2d at 569. The court noted that its holding would give
"fair treatment" to the insurers who need to be protected from paying claims where
causation is doubtful, whereas a literal reading of the clause would work an "arbitrary forfeiture" on the insured while giving unwarranted protection to the insurer.
Id
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policy language, the trial court observed, "[n]evertheless, the fair application and development of law is more than a matter of good linguistic analysis, and a legal result should not be accepted merely
because it is called for by contractual language."18 9 The court, noting the soundness of the Bume position, concurred with the Bume
court that the enforcement of the time limitation would be arbitrary
and unreasonable where the cause of death is clear. 190 In addition,
the court noted that there existed a great social utility in having losses
covered by insurance, and, on that basis, enunciated the previously
unarticulated public policy that "courts should find coverage wherThe Law Division deterever it is possible to do so on a fair basis."''
mined that it was the broad purpose of the time limitation to protect
insurers from having to pay on policies where there was some doubt
that the death was caused by the accident. 92 The court reasoned
that its approach of requiring "clear and convincing" proof of causation whenever death occurred after the expiration of the time limit,
would not defeat the purpose of the policy provision193 and would
give fair treatment to both the parties involved. 194
189. Id at 325, 353 A.2d at 566. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see
notes 190-94 and accompanying text nfra. For a discussion of Bume, see notes 78-115
and accompanying text supra.
190. 139 N.J. Super. at 326, 353 A.2d at 568.
191. Id. This approach would result in the reading of a time limitation in an
insurance policy in terms of its "broad purpose and function" whenever a literal
reading would work to defeat coverage. Id
192. Id at 325-26, 353 A.2d at 568. The court stated that this purpose was a
"sound one" because, generally, as the time interval between the accident and eventual death increases, so does the likelihood that an intervening cause was responsible
for or at least contributed to the insured's death. Id
193. Id, 353 A.2d at 568-69.
194. Id 353 A.2d at 569. For a discussion of the court's reasoning regarding
"fair treatment," see note 188 and accompanying text supra. The court limited its
holding by explicitly stating that not all time limitation provisions in insurance policies should be read in a broad functional sense and that some provisions must be read
literally (e.g., time term setting forth the period of coverage), since to do otherwise
would destroy any fair and reasonable limitations on coverage. 139 N.J. Super. at
325-26, 353 A.2d at 569.
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the defendant insurer's argument that
the accidental death coverage was only meant to be very limited in scope because of
the very modest charge for such coverage. In the 1953 and 1966 policies, the accidental death coverage cost $9.60 and $8.80 per year respectively, whereas the cost of
basic life coverage was $185.00 and $256.80 per year respectively. Id at 327-28, 353
A.2d at 569. The court grounded its rejection of this claim on two points. First, the
defendant, in interrogatory answers, stated that there was "no relation between the
premium for the accidental death benefits and the time limitations set forth therein."
Id Secondly, the court determined that, based on death statistics, the meaningful
factor in setting the low premium is not the time of death, but rather the cause of
death. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the court concluded that accidental death premiums were low because a relatively small percentage of deaths in the United States
in 1967 (6.17%) resulted from accidents. Id
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On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
affirmed the award of accidental death benefits. , 95 The court pointed
out that it was not deciding whether such time limitations were void
as against public policy in all cases. 19 6 Rather, the court merely
adopted a limited interpretation of the Burne rationale, holding that
time limitations in accidental death benefit provisions would not be
enforced where the accident was the clear cause of death.197 The
court advanced the theory that the insurance policy was an "adhesion
contract" and reasoned that to enforce the limitation in such an instance would be arbitrary and unreasonable.' 98 The court indicated
that members of the public who purchase insurance are entitled to
protection to the extent necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations, and that insurance policy provisions that, read literally, would
nullify insurance coverage should be read restrictively so as to enable
a fair fulfillment of the policy's objective.' 99 The Karl court concluded that because the policy objective was to protect the insurer
from having to pay dubious claims, 20 0 a restrictive reading of the policy provision so as to allow recovery when causation was not in dis195. 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977). The judgment of the
Law Division was reversed only insofar as it awarded counsel fees to the plaintiff. Id.
at 188, 381 A.2d at 65. For a discussion of the Law Division's limited holding, see
notes 179-94 and accompanying text supra.
196. Id at 185, 381 A.2d at 64.
197. Id at 186, 185-88, 381 A.2d at 64.
198. Id at 185, 381 A.2d at 64 (citing Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44
N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1961). The adhesion contract argument had not been discussed in the trial court's opinion. Id For a discussion of adhesion contracts, see note
39 supra. Under this argument, it is thought to be unrealistic to interpret an insurance contract solely upon the mutual intention of the parties as evidenced by the
policy language because the language and form of the agreement are generally prepared by the insurer and offered to the insured on a "take it or leave it basis." 154
N.J. Super. at 185, 381 A.2d at 64. See also R. KEETON, supra note 3, § 6.3(a) at 350
("Insurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion, under which the insured
is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions offered him, even
when the standard forms are prescribed by public officials rather than insurers.");
Daver, supra note 39, at 6; 1 G. COUCH, supra note 52, § 15.25, at 687-88 (absent
fraud, insurance contracts are enforceable according to their terms notwithstanding
the fact that the insurer chose the language and the insured may not have read and
understood the provision). Thus, the court determined that in interpreting such policies, it is the "reasonable expectation of the average purchaser in light of the contract
language" that must be considered. 154 N.J. Super. at 185-86, 381 A.2d at 64 (citing
Linden Motor Freight Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511, 524-25, 193 A.2d 217
(1963)).
199. See 154 N.J. Super. at 186, 381 A.2d at 64 (quoting Kievit v. Loyal Protection Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 482-83, 170 A.2d 22, 26 (1961)).
200. 154 N.J. Super. at 186, 381 A.2d at 64 (citing 139 N.J. Super. at 327, 353
A.2d at 568). For a discussion of the Law Division's articulation of the broad purpose
and function of the time limitation, see notes 192-94 and accompanying text supra.
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pute would not frustrate the policy's objective. 20 '
Thus, while the Karl opinions have taken the lead of the Burne
court, they have limited the Burne interpretation of limitation provisions to cases in which the cause of death is clear. 20 2 The Karl trial
court further delineated this interpretation by requiring that causation be proven clearly and convincingly, presumably as a safeguard
20 3
for the insurer.
D.

The Process of Nature Rule.- National Life & Accident Insurance
Co. v. Edwards

In National Life &Accident Insurance Co. v. Edwards, 20 4 the California Court of Appeal added yet another variant to the construction of
time limitation conditions in accidental death provisions: the "process of nature" rule. 20 5 The "process of nature" rule, previously only
applied to disability policies, traces the debilitation of the insured
from the time of injury to eventual total disability, or in the life insurance context, from injury to death.2 0 6 The rationale underlying the
rule's application is that "in a large majority of instances . . . the real
nature and extent of injuries are not revealed until sometime in the
future. . . [T]he processes of nature may be busily engaged in developing what may have seemed to be a slight hurt into a most serious
and perhaps fatal injury." 20 7 In National Life, the insured had
purchased a life insurance policy containing a provision for double
indemnity in the event the insured died as the result of injuries sustained in a vehicular accident within ninety days of the accident. 20
As the result of an automobile accident, the insured was rendered a
quadriplegic from the date of the accident until his death, over two
201. 154 N.J. Super. at 186, 381 A.2d at 64. The court reasoned that where the
objective of the time limitation provision is to protect insurers from having to pay
doubtful claims and there is no dispute that the covered accident caused the insured's
death, recovery would in no way frustrate the objective of the provision. Id
202. See notes 188-97 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
court's reliance upon Burne, see notes 189-90 and accompanying text supra.
203. 139 N.J. Super. at 327, 353 A.2d at 568. For a discussion of the Karl court's
interpretation of Bume, see notes 179-94 and accompanying text supra.
204. 119 Cal. App. 3d 326, 174 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981).
205. Id
206. Id at 332-33, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
207. Id at 333, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
208. Id at 331, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The policy provided a face amount coverage of $4,000 with an additional $4,000 payable only if the insured's death occurred
within 10 years following the issuance of the policy. Id The policy also contained a
vehicular accident provision, whereby the named beneficiary would receive $8,000
(twice the face amount) if death occurred within 90 days from the date of the deathcausing vehicular accident. Id
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years later. 209 Although the insured's death certificate indicated that
he died of bilateral bronchopneumonia as a result of the spinal cord
injury he received in the automobile accident, 210 and although the
parties stipulated that the disabling effects of the injuries were continuous until his death, 21 1 the insurer refused to pay under the policy's
double indemnity provision on the ground that death occurred more
21 2
than ninety days after the injuries were sustained.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal addressed the issue of
whether the "process of nature" rule should apply to time limitation
clauses in accidental death provisions. 2 13 At the outset the court
noted that although the "process of nature" rule had been confirmed
as the law in California, its application had been limited to disability
policies. 2 14 In the disability context, the onset of the disability was
considered to relate back to the time of the accident wherever it could
be established that the disability arose directly from the accident,
notwithstanding time limitation provisions which would have otherwise cut off coverage before the person affected was brought to a state
of total disability. 21 5 Making what it purported to be a "reasonable
209. Id.The insured's accident occurred on March 2, 1974. He died on March
22, 1976, 751 days following the date of the accident. Id.
210. Id
211. Id
212. Id at 330, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 33. In granting summary judgment for the
insured, the trial court refused to apply the "process of nature" rule advanced by the
beneficiary in an effort to defeat the time limitation clause. Id at 332, 174 Cal. Rptr.
at 34.
213. Id at 332, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 34. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see
notes 214-24 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the "process of nature"
rule, see text accompanying notes 206-07 supra.
214. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The court noted that while
the "process of nature" rule was adopted in judicial decisions in other states, it was
first applied by a California court in Frenzer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident
Ass'n, 27 Cal. App. 2d 406, 81 P.2d 197 (1938). In Frenzer, the court held that "when
a disability follows from accidental injury within such time as processes of nature
consume in bringing the affected person to the state of total incapacity . . .such
disability is immediate" under the terms of an accident insurance policy provision
which covered disability only if the insured suffered an accidental injury which immediately, continuously, and wholly disabled the insured. Id at 413, 81 P.2d at 201.
The NationalLift court noted that despite the "substantial and growing body of law"
which applied the "process of nature" rule to disability policies, courts have been
reluctant to extend the concept to time limitation provisions in double indemnity life
insurance policies. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 333, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35. For another court's
application of the "process of nature" rule, see Booth v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 3 N.J. Misc. 735, 130 A. 131 (1925) ("process of nature" rule applied
where a seemingly minor head injury caused vision impairment, mental discoordination, and later paralysis).
215. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (citing Willden v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 3d 631, 635, 557 P.2d 501, 503-04, 135 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71-72
(1976) (quoting Schilk v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 302, 307, 78
Cal. Rptr. 60 (1969).
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extension" of California law, the National Life court determined that
the "process of nature" rule should also be applied to time limitations
in accidental death provisions. 21 6 The court reasoned that a strict
and literal interpretation of the policy provision would lead to an un2 17
just result and an unreasonable restriction of coverage.
-In reaching its decision that the "process of nature" rule could
properly be applied to defeat time limitation clauses in accidental
double indemnity death provisions, the court rejected both the majority rule upholding such provisions as well as several of the theories
upon which that rule was based. 2 18 The court stated that, rather than
being a product of negotiation, the double indemnity agreement was
a "classic example of a contract of adhesion" so as not to require the
traditional literal enforcement. 21 9 Moreover, the court concluded
that modern medicine has made "ridiculous" the premise that ninety
days is a fair length of time for the final result of an accident to occur, 2 20 and that the time limitations were not suitable substitutes for
an actual determination of the cause of the insured's death. 22' In addition to rejecting the majority rule, the court also summarily determined that it was not necessary to adopt or extend the public policy
rationale espoused in Burne. 222
216. Id at 334, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
217. Id at 333, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (citing Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3d 1026, 1034
(1971)).
218. Id at 333-36, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35-38. For a discussion of the court's rejection of the several theories underpinning the majority rule, see notes 219-21 and accompanying text tn/ra. For a discussion of the majority rule, see notes 20-77 and
accompanying text supra.
219. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 334, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The court rejected the
notion espoused in Brown v. United States Casualty Co., that the insured had contracted
with the insurer with "full awareness" of the time limitation provision and that the
inclusion of such provision was reached through the parties' negotations. Id (citing
95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899)). Rather, it was noted by the court that the insured
"had no opportunity to bargain or render the provision inapplicable." Id. For a
discussion of Brown, see notes 33-46 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
the adhesion contract theory, see note 198 supra. See also Karl v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 154 N.J. Super. at 185-86, 381 A.2d at 64.
220. 119 Cal. App.3d at 334, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (citing Burne v. Franklin Life
Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973) (insured's life was prolonged for 41/2 years
by the use of sophisticated medical techniques and life support equipment)). For a
discussion of Burne, see notes 78-115 and accompanying text supra.
221. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 334-35, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36. In rejecting the argument that such time limitation provisions were inserted to provide a solution to
problems presented by questions concerning cause of death, the court pointed out
that it was the function of the court to "admit evidence on actual causation rather
than rely on some arbitrary time limitation." Id.The court also indicated that, in
the instant case, the policy language puts the burden of establishing causation upon
the claimant. The court observed further that it was unaware of any actuarial or
statistical basis for the selection of a 90-day limitations period. Id
222. Id.at 334, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The court opined that it was not necessary

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss2/2

34

Arena: The Validity of Time Limitations in Accidental Multiple Indemnity
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 378

Thus, in reversing the summary judgment for the insurer and
remanding the action, the Naizonal Life court held that, as a matter of
law, the "process of nature" rule is applicable to insurance policy
clauses which limit death benefits to instances where the insured's
death occurs within a specified time period from the accident. 223 Further, the court held that the time limitation clause was not invalid as
a matter of public policy and that the trial court must admit evidence
on actual causation and instruct the jury as to the "process of nature"
rule, rather than merely relying on an adhesive arbitrary policy
224
limitation.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

2 25
Prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Burne,
courts had uniformly upheld time limitations in accidental multiple

indemnity life insurance provisions as valid and enforceable limitations on coverage. 226 These decisions were based on a strict application of contract law 22 7 with supplementary reliance on the purported

purposes of the provisions 228 and the intentions of the parties as perceived by the courts.2 29 These provisions had been unsuccessfully
to hold that time limitation clauses in accidental death provisions were invalid as a
matter of public policy. Id. Rather, the court viewed its holding merely as a "reasonable extension" of the "process of nature" rule. Id.
223. Id at 335-36, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 36. The court reversed and remanded the
decision of the trial court with the order that the matter be permitted to proceed to
trial with the appropriate instruction as to the "process of nature" rule. Id.
224. Id. at 336, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 36. For a discussion of the court's characterization of the time limitation provision as a contract of adhesion, see note 219 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the court's characterization of the time
limitation provision as an arbitrary limitation on coverage, see note 221 and accompanying text supra.
225. 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973). For a discussion of Burne, see notes 78115 and accompanying text supra.
226. For a discussion of cases upholding time limitation provisions, see notes 1977 and accompanying text supra.
227. See, e.g., McKinney v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Co., 211 F.
951 (8th Cir. 1914); Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1899); Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938); Perry
v. Provident Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 99 Mass. 162 (1868). For a discussion of McKinney,
see notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Brown, see notes 3346 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Mulins, see notes 48-53 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Perry, see notes 20-31 and accompanying text supra.
228. See, e.g., Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1899). For a discussion of the purpose of such limitations as articulated by the court
in Brown, see notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of several
arguments which have been offered by the courts as to why such limitations are valid,
see Note, supra note 5, at 601.
229. See, e.g., Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928
(1938). For a discussion of Mulins, see notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
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challenged as being ambiguous, 23 0 unfair, 23 ' contrary to the main
2 33
provision of the policy, 23 2 and invalid as against public policy.
With the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Burne, vitality was given to the applicability of the "void as against public policy" rationale.
In the years following the Bume decision, several courts have considered the continued validity of such limitations, and, with the noted
exceptions of New Jersey 234 and California, 235 the public policy argument has been rejected. 236 Although, like the pre-Bume decisions,
these decisions explicitly rejected the void as against public policy rationale, it is clear that the post-Bume decisions can be contrasted to
the pre-Bume decisions on the basis of the extent of consideration
given to public policy arguments. 237 In the pre-Bume period, the
courts either summarily rejected public policy arguments or gave
them only superficial consideration before reaching a determination
based on a strict application of contract law. 238 In the post-Bume pe230. See, e.g., Mullins v. National Casualty Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928
(1938); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964);
Crome v. North Am. Accident Ins. Co., 96 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
231. See, e.g., Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1899).
232. See, e.g., Perry v. Provident Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 99 Mass. 162 (1868);
Alamo Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cardwell, 67 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
233. See, e.g., Bennett v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794
(1939); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
See generally IC J. APPLEMAN, SUpra note 1, § 612, at 129; Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3d 1311,
1313 (1974).
234. See Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 NJ. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Law
Div. 1976), affd, 154 NJ. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977) (time limitation
provision should not be read literally to preclude recovery where death does not occur within a specified time period, but rather should be read as requiring that there
be "clear and convincing" evidence that the accident was the cause of death). For a
discussion of Karl, see notes 179-203 and accompanying text supra.
235. See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App. 3d 326,
174 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981) (application of the "process of nature" rule to time limitation in accidental death provision of life insurance policy). For a discussion of National Lif, see notes 204-24 and accompanying text supra.
236. See, e.g., Haines v. Southern Life and Health Ins. Co., 363 So.2d 175 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Kirk v. Financial Sec. Life Ins. Co., 75 Ill. 2d 367, 389 N.E.2d
144 (1978), rev'g, 54 Ill. App. 192, 369 N.E.2d 340 (1977); Fontenot v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the U.S., 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1978). For a discussion of
Htatees, see notes 171-200 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Kirk, see
notes 148-67 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Fontenot, see notes 13347 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Rhoades, see notes 121-32 and
accompanying text supra.
237. For a discussion of the post-Bume decisions, see notes 118-77 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the pre-Bume decisions, see notes 19-76 and
accompanying text supra.
238. See, e.g., Brown v. United States Casualty Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
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riod, the courts have to a greater extent addressed and attempted to
2 39
rebut the major arguments underpinning the Burne rationale.
Thus, as a result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Burne, the courts have been forced to give greater consideration to the
public policy rationale as a legitimate argument. 240 As a consequence
of this heightened consideration, it is submitted that the courts have
placed greater reliance upon causation as a determining factor in the
interpretation of time limitation clauses. The most obvious example
of such reliance is in Karl where the court concluded that it would, in
effect, disregard time limitations whenever there was "clear and convincing" evidence of causation. 24 1 Similarly, the Haznes dicta, indicating that a different outcome may have resulted had there been a
closer nexus between the accident and death, demonstrates the impact which causation may have in future decisions.2 42 The importance of causation was also evidenced in National Life, where the
court, although not reaching a determination on the Burne public policy rationale, applied the "process of nature" rule and in effect substituted a rule of causation for the time limitation provision. 24 3 Further,
it is submitted that the importance of causation in the interpretation
of time limitation provisions is also borne out by post-Burne decisions
which have rejected the Burne rationale, but which have indicated
that the purpose of the limitations was to resolve potential disputes
over causation. 244 Thus, the question that must be asked of and answered by courts in the future is, "If causation is not in dispute, of
what significance is the time limitation?"
1899); Bennett v. Life Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939);
Weickselbaum v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 129 N.Y.S.2d
612 (1954), affdmem., 284 A.D. 987, 136 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), appeal
dented, 285 A.D. 894, 139 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div. 1955). For a discussion of these
cases, see notes 33-46, 64-71 and accompanying text supra.
239. For an example of these cases, see cases cited in note 236 supra.
240. For a discussion of opinions which have considered the public policy rationale, see notes 118-203 and accompanying text supra.
241. See Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Law
Div. 1976),af'd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977). For a discussion
of Karl, see notes 178-203 and accompanying text thfra.
242. See Haines v. Southern Life and Health Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978). For a discussion of the Haies dicta, see notes 175-77 and accompanying text supra.
243. See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App. 3d 326,
174 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981). For a discussion of the Edwards rationale, see notes 205-24
and accompanying text supra.
244. See, e.g., Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App.
1978). In Fontenot, the court stated that the purpose of the limitation provision is to
"minimize uncertainty and dispute as to the cause of death alledgedly due to accidental means by preventing the accident from being too remote in time." Id at 1188.
For a discussion of Fontenot, see notes 133-47 and accompanying text sup ra.
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How future opinions will resolve the issue of the validity of time
limitation clauses in multiple indemnity provisions can only be the
subject of speculation. It is submitted that the broad interpretation
of Burne, that the time limitations are void as against public policy in
all instances, will not be readily adopted. 245 However, it is clear that
claimants under policies with this type of time limitation will continue to attack such provisions on the ground that they are violative
of public policy and therefore unenforceable. 246 Similarly, it can be
anticipated that future opinions will continue to give greater consideration to the public policy rationale and perhaps even adopt the limited interpretation of the Burne rationale as did the court in Karl,247
and thereby limit the enforcement of such provisions to instances
where there is no "clear and convincing" evidence that the accident
was the cause of death. 248 Alternatively, it is possible, although not
probable, that future decisions may follow the lead of the California
court in National Life and apply the "process of nature" rule in the
accident insurance context. 249 These approaches would enable a
court to reach an outcome which parallels that arguably intended by
the court in Burne, without necessitating a decision on the general
validity of time limitation provisions. 250 In any event, as a result of
Burne, jurisdictions that have not yet considered this issue will be required to reexamine the rationales previously accepted in support of
25
the validity of such time limitations. '
Samuelj. Areza, Jr.

245. See, e.g., Kirk v. Financial Sec. Life Ins. Co., 75 I11. 2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144
(1978), rev'g, 54 Ill. App. 192, 369 N.E.2d 340 (1977); Fontenot v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y

of the U.S., 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1978). For a discussion of Kirk, see
notes 148-67 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Fontenot, see notes 13347 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Rhoades, see notes 121-32 and
accompanying text supra.
246. See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3D 1311, 1313 (1971). See also Note, supra
note 5, at 600.

247. Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Law

Div. 1976), af'd, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (App. Div. 1977). For a discussion
of Karl, see notes 179-203 and accompanying text supra.

248. For a discussion of the Karl court's application of the Bume rationale, see
notes 189-94 and accompanying text supra.

249. See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App. 3d 326,
174 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1981). For a general discussion of National Life, see notes 207-24
and accompanying text supra.
250. See 119 Cal. App. 3d 326, 334, 174 Cal. Rptr. 31, 35 (1981).
251. See Note, supra note 1, at 864.
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